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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Pathological memory functioning in alcoholics has been 
viewed as both cause and consequence of prolonged abuse. 
Specific differences in alcoholics from nonalcoholics in the 
processing of emotionally charged stimuli have been implicat-
ed in the addictive process. In a study conducted by this 
author and preliminary to the present study, differences 
between alcoholic and nonalcoholic subjects in the accuracy 
of their memories for the frequency of occurrence of emotion-
ally charged stimuli were demonstrated. The target stimuli 
used in the preliminary study were the subjects' own mood 
states as recorded on self-report forms over a two week pe-
riod. A memory task was later administered, in which the 
subjects estimated the frequency of occurrence of their moods 
during the recording period. 
When these memory estimates were compared to the 
previously recorded rates of mood occurrence it was found 
that the estimates from subjects in both groups were highly 
accurate. Some evidence was found for a small decrement in 
memory accuracy in the alcoholic group. However, when 
accuracy was examined by the emotional content of the 
estimated stimuli, larger group differences emerged. 
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Although the alcoholics appeared to have more random error in 
their estimates, they also demonstrated less systematic error 
than the non-alcoholic subjects, whose judgments could pe 
called defensive, in that their estimates maximized positive 
moods and minimized negative moods. The systematic error 
demonstrated by the alcoholic subjects was in the same di-
rection as that of the nonalcoholics less extreme. Since 
the preliminary study focused on possible cognitive deficits 
in alcoholics and therefore on accuracy, an extensive investi-
gation of the effects of mood relevant content of items on 
memory bias was beyond its scope. 
The literature on the effects of depression on 
cognitive processes, however, suggested a possible 
explanation of these results. That is, the two groups may 
have differed in level of depression, resulting in different 
degrees of accuracy and bias for various kinds of affective 
memories. When the literature on depression and cognition 
was reviewed, several theoretical perspectives on depression 
and cognitive performance emerged (such as the learned 
helplessness model of depression, the depressive realism 
model, and theories of mood selectivity effects) which 
predict different degrees and types of bias in affective 
memories for depressed and nondepressed persons. Separate 
trait and state depression effects on memory were 
hypothesized to mediate these predicted differences. The 
literature on the incidence and etiology of depression in 
alcoholics, and the escape theory of alcohol addiction 
suggested that these predictions and hypothesized processes 
may be relevant to alcoholics. The present study combined 
these related lines of research and theory in order to make 
and test predictions about the relationship between 
depression and memory biases. 
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The present study used archival data to investigate the 
role of depressed affect as a variable mediating the 
differences found in the preliminary study. Trait depression 
as measured by the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory (MMPI) and state depression as measured by the 
Symptom Checklist 90 (SCL 90) were used to measure specific 
types of depressed mood and mood predispositions. An adapted 
version of the Experience Sampling Form (ESF), an inventory 
similar to the Program of Mood States (POMS) was used to 
measure positive and negative affect more generally over the 
two week reporting period described earlier. 
The present study focused on bias rather than accuracy 
in memory. Also, in addition to self-reports and memory 
estimates, behavioral measures were developed in an attempt 
to understand the amount and kinds of cognitive strategies 
used by alcoholics and nonalcoholics in their performance of 
memory tasks, and how these differences might be related to 
specific types of depression, and to negative affect more 
generally. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Alcoholism and Memory for Mood Occurrence 
In the literature on cognitive functioning of 
alcoholics, there is a growing consensus that neurological~ 
damage to some extent accounts for their usually poorer 
performance on a wide variety of tasks, including those 
involving memory functions (Becker & Kaplan, 1986; Butters & 
Cermak, 1980; Goldman, 1983; Parson & Farr, 1981). There is 
evidence that alcoholics may be specifically impaired in 
certain types of memory for emotional events (Cowan, 1983; 
Ellis, Thomas, McFarland, & Lane, 1985; Johnson, Kim, & 
Risse, 1985; Markowitsch, Kessler, & Bast-Kessler, 1984; 
Markowitsch, Kessleer, & Dezler, 1986; Warrington, 1986). Yet 
access to memory for moods and emotional events may be 
essential to the treatment of alcoholism and prevention of 
relapse (Freed, 1978; Goldman, 1983; Sussman, Rychtarik, 
Mlueser, Glynn, & Prue, 1986) as it is to the development of 
changes of self in all individuals (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 
1977). 
One basic memory function which has been meagerly in-
vestigated in alcoholic subjects is memory for frequency of 
4 
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occurrences. This is the kind of memory required to answer 
such questions as: were you sad more often this week, or in 
the previous week. A substantial body of experimental 
evidence suggests that adult humans are highly sensitive to 
the frequency of occurrence of events (Hasher & Zacks, 1984; 
Greene, 1986; Naveh-Benjamin & Jonides, 1986). In the verbal 
learning paradigm that has most often been used to evaluate 
the abilities of persons to accurately estimate frequencies 
of presented target items, correlations between actual and 
estimated frequencies of occurrence have typically been in 
the high .80's (Zechmeister & Nyberg, 1982). However, 
because of the limited procedures and stimulus materials that 
have been investigated, it is difficult to generalize from 
existing laboratory studies to naturalistic settings. 
An investigation of memory for frequency of occurrences 
in which alcoholic subjects were compared to non-alcoholic 
subjects was conducted by the present writer (Richards, 
1986). The study focused specifically on-memories for one's 
own mood states and experiences, as in the example question 
above. There were two objectives in conducting this study. 
The first objective was to determine if the high correlation 
between estimated and actual rates of occurrence obtained 
under laboratory conditions could be obtained in a more 
ecologically relevant setting. The second objective was to 
examine differences in judgment accuracy between alcoholic 
and non-alcoholic subjects. 
Several theories were used to develop hypotheses 
about groµp performance on a task of memory for frequency of 
occurrences of moods. Automatic Processing Hypotheses. 
predicted high correlations between estimates and recorded 
moods for all subjects, regardless of alcoholism status 
(Hasher & Zacks, 1984). Availability Heuristic Hypotheses, 
predicted differences in accuracy related to stimulus 
content, with subjects overestimating the frequency of 
stimuli that are relevant or salient to them (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973). Availability Heuristic Hypotheses in this 
context, assume that the content of salient stimuli is 
different for alcoholics and non-alcoholics. A third set of 
hypotheses were generated from the prediction of impaired 
performance in alcoholics paralleling the cognitive 
impairments found in other types of memory tasks (Goldman, 
1983). 
Self-reported mood state data was collected for 
alcoholic and non-alcoholic subjects over a two week period. 
As they conducted their usual daily routines, subjects were 
cued by means of long-range pagers to pause and record their 
moods. The record was made on a standard form that included 
a ten item self-rating of mood at the time of the cue. At 
the end of two weeks, subjects were asked to estimate their 
recorded moods from memory, using another standard form. 
Difference scores for each subject on each mood item were 
derived by subtracting each frequency from its corresponding 
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estimate. Both signed and absolute values of differences 
were used to investigate group performance. 
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Both groups tended to overestimate positive items and 
underestimate negative items. Estimates correlated with 
actual frequencies at .82 across groups, with some subjects 
having correlations as high as .99. Evidence for relative 
memory impairment in alcoholic subjects was present but weak. 
Stronger evidence was found for differences between groups 
related to content of stimuli. A trend was demonstrated for 
nonalcoholic subjects to systematically underestimate 
negative moods and systematically overestimate positive moods 
more than alcoholic subjects. For positive mood items this 
overestimation difference approached significance. Although 
alcoholic subjects demonstrated overestimation and 
underestimation in the same direction as other subjects, 
their systematic distortions were not as extreme and 
estimates by alcoholics contained more error that was 
apparently unsystematic. The nonalcoholic group's accuracy 
appeared more sensitive to evaluative content than the 
alcoholic group. 
These patterns of error were surprising in that they 
appeared inconsistent with Availability Heuristic Theory, 
which predicted that group biases in accuracy would depend on 
the relevance of item content, with subjects overestimating 
items more relevant to their concerns, due to the increase of 
salience at encoding and availability at recall of such 
items, resulting from biases in set. Instead, the groups 
were found to be similar in direction of bias, but different 
in degree. It was not apparent that Availability Heuristic 
Theory could provide an explanation of these group biases, 
except by resorting to the rather untenable argument that 
alcoholic subjects had experienced all items as less salient 
than nonalcoholic subjects. Other theoretical approaches 
toward cognitive performances were sought to account for the 
observed group differences. 
Depression as a Possible Mediator of 
Differences in Memory Biases 
8 
A related area of research suggested a possible 
explanation of the results described above. Effects similar 
to the overestimation and underestimation trends found in the 
preliminary study have been reported· in the literature on 
human learning and depression. Depressed subjects have 
demonstrated the kinds of biased, systematic distortions in 
learning predicted from social psychological theories of 
judgment biases, while depressed subjects demonstrated such 
distortions to a lesser extent. A kind of depressive realism 
was described by Alloy and Abramson (1979). In their studies 
of estimation of contingency of reward on behavior (to be 
described in detail later in this review), depressed subjects 
were more accurate in their estimates of contingencies of 
outcomes than were non-depressed controls, who tended to 
overestimate contingencies in the direction that would be 
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more desirable or beneficial to themselves. The researchers 
concluded that nondepressed subjects succumb to various 
"cognitive illusions" more easily than do depressed subjects, 
and that depressed persons may be in a sense "sadder but 
wiser". 
The results of both Hasher and Zacks (1979) and Alloy 
and Abramson (1979) contradict in similar ways predictions of 
some cognitive theories of depression. These theories 
emphasize the depressed person's inability to accurately 
perceive events and reconstruct reality in a consensual way 
(Beck, 1974). The depressed person is viewed as consistently 
distorting the future, ongoing events, and the past in ways 
that both place the self in a negative light, and reflect the 
anticipation of failure and defeat. 
In regard to cognitive performance on hedonically 
charged tasks, several studies support the hypothesis that 
increased inaccuracy of perception of frequency of 
reinforcement may result from depression ( Buchwald, 1977; 
Wener & Rehm, 1975). Other studies have found the picture 
far more complicated, and in some ways approaching the 
greater accuracy for depressives found by Alloy and Abramson 
(1979) in studies of perception of contingency of 
reinforcement. Rather than following contemporary theories 
of depression (e.g., Beck, 1976) by displaying a self-blaming 
attributional style, depressed subjects ·have often been found 
to be less biased in their attributions about causes of 
success or failure, and less biased in their judgments of 
contingency of reinforcement than nondepressed subjects 
(Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Abramson & Alloy, 1981; Kuiper, 
1978; Raps, Peterson, Reinhard, Abramson, & Seligman, 1982; 
Tennen & Hezberger, 1987). Nelson and Craighead (1977) for 
example, found depressed subjects to be more accurate about 
frequency of punishment than nondepressed subjects (who 
underestimated the amount of both punishment and 
non-reinforcement), while simultaneously significantly 
underestimating the amount of positive reinforcement. 
If such findings about estimates of contingency and 
reinforcement frequency can be generalized to estimates of 
mood occurrence, it is conceivable that the differential 
biases found in the preliminary study were mediated by 
different levels of depression in the two groups, while 
differences in unsystematic error (caused by cognitive 
deficits in alcoholics) were obscured by the same 
depression-related biases. 
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Some evidence supporting the hypothesis that the 
nonalcoholic and alcoholic groups differed in level of 
depression was found in the preliminary study data. Rough 
inferences about the level of depression can be made based on 
differences in the frequencies of moods recorded by the 
subjects in each group. The two groups were not 
significantly different in mean occurrence of combined 
positive mood states, with the nonalcoholic group having a 
11 
mean of 53.8% with a standard deviation of 19.4%; whereas the 
alcoholic. group had a mean of 58.42% with a standard 
deviation of 16.5% • The two groups were significantly· 
different in moods states that were neither positive nor 
negative, with the nonalcoholic group having mean of 29.3% 
with a standard deviation of 17.1%, whereas the alcoholic 
group had a mean of 18.3% with a standard deviation of 13.5%. 
The differences in the occurrence of combined negative 
moods approached significance, with the nonalcoholic group 
mean being 16.8% , with a standard deviation of 8.1%, whereas 
the alcoholic group had a mean of 23.3% and a standard 
deviation of 13.5%. When individual negative mood items were 
examined, three of ten resulted in significant differences at 
the .05 level (i.e., Angry, Confused, and Ashamed) and one 
(Tense) resulted in a significant difference at the .01 level 
with the alcoholic group having the higher mean for all ten 
negative mood states over two weeks. The alcoholic group 
could be described as experiencing more negative affect, 
similar levels of positive affect, and less "neutral" 
emotional time relative to the nonalcoholic group. These 
differences are similar to those expected between two groups 
with different levels of negative affectivity (Watson & 
Clark, 1984) a variable known to be highly associated with 
depression. 
With these differences in mood experiences in mind, a 
post hoc attempt was made to determine if they were related 
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to the differences in accuracy of memory for moods, as 
various theories of depressed affect would predict. The 
emphasis of the preliminary study was on accuracy rather than 
systematic bias related to mood content. Because of this, no 
measure of total bias by mood content was used in analyses. 
A related measure that captures much of the same information, 
the correlation coefficient normalized by the r to z 
transformation (Hays, 1973) was used in a subsequent analyses 
of the data relevant to the current discussion. Often 
referred to as a discrimination coefficient in the literature 
on frequency of occurrences (Flexnor & Bower,1975) the 
correlational measure of accuracy is a measure of relative 
accuracy. It answers the question of how strongly related 
are the subjects estimates and their target items. A high 
correlation can result from either high absolute accuracy, or 
systematic inaccuracy. 
The correlation of each subject's estimates with the 
corresponding actual rates of occurrence of their moods 
across 30 items was calculated. Based on this measure, the 
two groups were virtually identical in relative accuracy: the 
nonalcoholic group mean was .83 with a standard deviation of 
.15, while the alcoholic group mean was .80 with a standard 
deviation of .18. Group status alone had a nonsignificant 
correlation with accuracy of only .03. To investigate the 
possibility that evaluative direction might be interacting 
with group status and level of frequency of various moods to 
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influence accuracy, several correlational analyses were 
performed. Since an interaction with group was suspected, 
separate analyses by group were conducted initially. The 
correlation of level of positive mood with accuracy was 
determined to be nonsignificant in the nonalcoholic sample (r 
= .23), but significant in the alcoholic sample (r = .555, £ 
= 05). 
This differential predictability having confirmed an 
interaction between group, mood state occurrence and 
accuracy, a multiple regression analysis was conducted with 
the subjects from both groups combined. Overall accuracy as 
measured by the above described discrimination coefficient 
was predicted from each subject's mean frequency of positive 
moods, mean frequency of negative moods, and mean frequency 
of mood responses in neither the positive or negative 
category, with group membership and interaction terms as 
additional predicters. The final stepwise equation accounted 
for 57.8% of the variance in accuracy scores, with the rate 
of positive mood accounting for the largest percent of 
explained variance, the rate of negative mood accounting for 
the second highest percent of variance, and several 
interactions between mood rates and group status accounting 
for other significant proportions of variance in accuracy 
scores. 
Taken together, these three correlational analyses 
supported the hypothesis that the frequency of mood 
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experienced over the two week interval was related 
differently to accuracy in the alcoholic and nonalcoholic 
groups. It appeared that positive mood frequency and negative 
mood frequency interacted with group status to moderate 
differences in mood accuracy. The low sample sizes and low 
probabilites of Type I error suggested that these 
relationships were fairly robust. 
Overall, several aspects of the preliminary study 
implicated depression as a variable of interest in memory 
differences between alcoholics and nonalcoholics. With this 
background, the next three sub-sections will review areas of 
psychological literature supporting these implications. 
First the literature on the incidence of depression among 
alcoholics will be reviewed, to be followed by a review of 
the literature on the role of depression, affect, and 
affective memories in the etiology of alcoholism. A 
sub-section describing the literature on cognitive 
performance in depression will follow, outlining typical 
findings and their similarities to and differences from the 
findings of the preliminary study. 
The Incidence of Depression in Alcoholism 
The effects of depressed mood on memory would be 
irrelevant to the study of memory in alcoholics if the 
incidence of depression in alcoholism was not substantial. 
However, the higher incidence of trait depression among 
alcoholics when compared to nonalcoholics has been a 
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cornerstone of some theoretical and treatment approaches to 
alcohol addiction and was therefore viewed as a variable that 
might have mediated the differences between alcoholics ·and 
nonalcoholics detected in the preliminary study (Jaffe, & 
Ciraulo, 1986; Jones, 1968, 1971; Keeler, Taylor & Miller, 
1979; Neriano, 1981; Neriano, McCarthy & McCarthy, 1980; 
Wikler, 1973; Woodruff, Guze, Clayton, & Carr, 1973). 
Determining the incidence of depression among 
alcoholics and finding ways for screening for depression 
early in the recovery process has been of interest recently, 
since some investigators have suggested that among 
alcoholics, depressed alcoholics are most in need of 
intensive, long-term therapeutic programs (Willenbing, 1986). 
Some investigators, however, see no difference in treatment 
outcome and course of illness between depressed and 
nondepressed alcoholics (Hesselbrock, Hesselbrock, Tennen, 
Meyer, & Workman, 1983; Schuckit, 1983). Substantial 
evidence suggests that depressed alcoholics have longer 
histories of problem drinking, more previous treatments for 
alcohol misuse, more trouble in resisting use of alcohol, 
more marital problems, and more physical symptoms related to 
alcohol abuse than other alcoholics (McMahon & Davidson, 
1986). 
A recent study of depressed alcoholics found them to be 
more anxious, tense, restless, apprehensive, and having more 
somatic symptoms than nondepressed alcoholics (McMahon & 
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Davidson, 1986). There is also evidence that as a group they 
are more apt to be interpersonally detached with avoidant or 
asocial personality traits, to have disorganized and 
distracted cognition, and to have a negativistic self-image 
(McMahon & Davidson, 1985). 
In their review of the literature on the relationship 
between alcoholism and depression, Jaffe and Ciraulo (1986) 
noted that the percent of alcoholics considered clinically 
depressed depends on the diagnostic criteria and conceptual 
frames of the investigator, as well as on the point in the 
cycle of alcohol use and withdrawal in which the patients are 
assessed. Depressive symptoms may be very common and very 
intense in alcoholics without warranting the diagnosis of a 
separate affective illness. These depressive symptoms may 
clear up very quickly after detoxification. For example, one 
study reported as many as 98% of recently admitted patients 
reported depressive symptoms which waned after a few days to 
several weeks to normal levels (Shaw, Donley, Morgan, & 
Robinson, 1975). This has led some to the view that only a 
small percent of alcoholics have persistent severe depression 
(Keeler et al, 1979; Schuckit, 1979). 
Studies that attempted to examine the occurrence of 
more stable kinds of depression than depressive symptoms 
after detoxification have produced a wide range of estimates 
(Cadoret, Troughton, & Widmer, 1984; Freed, 1978; O'Sullivan, 
Daly, Carroll, Clare & Cooney, 1979; Schuckit, 1979, 1983). 
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For example, Weissman and Myers (1980) found 44% of community 
alcoholics had major depression, 15% had minor depression, 6% 
had bipolar depression and 18% were considered to have 
depressive personalities. Midanik (1983) found 33% of female 
problem drinkers and 17 % of male problem drinkers to have a 
coexistent depression. When the same study examined persons 
who were alcohol dependent, 56.6% of the females and 19% of 
males met the criteria for both disorders. Patients may also 
be divided into those who develop depression before alcohol 
use and those who develop it after chronic abuse, with the 
first group being considered primary depressives. In studies 
where primary depression was used as a criterion, estimates 
of the proportion of depressed patients ranged between 3% and 
46%, with the incidence of primary depression consistently 
more frequent among female alcoholics (Beck, Steer, & 
McElroy, 1982; Hesselbrock et al., 1983; Schuckit, 1983; 
Winokur, Rimmer & Reich, 1971). 
In summary, various measures of depressive symptoms 
taken at different points in the recovery process have 
resulted in widely different estimates of the incidence of 
clinical depression and depressive symptoms in alcoholic 
subjects. Depressive symptoms appear to be most extreme upon 
admission for treatment, with some gradual decrease over the 
treatment period. Despite this gradual decline in depressed 
affect, strong evidence exists that a substantial number of 
alcoholics also have long-standing clinical or sub-clinical 
depression. 
The Role of Depressed Affect and Affective 
Memories in the Etiology of Alcoholism 
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The high correlation between depressed affect and· 
alcoholism suggests a possible causal connection. Jaffe and 
Ciraulo (1983) listed ten possible causes for the high 
incidence of depression among alcoholics: 1) the direct toxic 
effects of alcohol on the brain; 2) indirect toxic effects, 
via other organs and body systems; 3) effects of alcohol 
withdrawal; 4) central nervous system (CNS) effects of drugs 
(other than alcohol) related to the treatment or use of 
alcohol; 5) CNS effects of injury or anoxia associated with 
alcohol-related trauma and/or suicidal gestures; 6) the 
effects of social losses related to alcohol use; 7) 
psychological responses to physical impairment related to 
alcohol use; 8) a personality disorder antedating the alcohol 
use, and perhaps resulting in alcohol abuse; 9) the effects 
of an independently transmitted affective disorder; and 10) 
the effects of a genetically transmitted vulnerability to 
both affective symptoms and alcoholism. 
Jaffe and Cirulo emphasized in their review the 
difficulty inherent in trying to investigate the relative 
importance of these possible contributing causes, underlining 
the difficulty in forming groups of alcoholics that are 
comparable in terms of the origins of their depressive 
symptoms, pr~blems in the diagnoses of personality disorders, 
and problems in identifying the temporal order of onset in 
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persons with both alcoholism and depression. To this list of 
difficulties can be added the differences in drinking history 
and length of abstinence encountered in clinical studies with 
alcoholics. Not all of the causes for the high relationship 
between alcoholism and depression suggested here are of 
direct relevance to the present study. Only two will be 
described in further detail: biological predispositions to 
both depression and alcoholism, and predisposing personality 
characteristics. 
The separation of primary depressives from other 
depressed alcoholics is of special importance in biological 
studies, because of its inferential value relative to 
understanding the causal relationship between alcoholism and 
depression. At one time, the apparent high incidence of 
primary depression in alcoholics and familial aggregation of 
both major depression and alcoholism was seen from a 
biological perspective as evidence that depressive and 
dysphoric mood played a causal role in the development of 
alcoholism, and that primary depression and alcoholism were 
manifestations of the same underlying genetic vulnerability 
(Bohman, Cloninger, von Knorring & Sigvardsson, 1984; 
Merikangas, Leckman, Prusoff, Pauls, & Weissman, 1985; 
Schuckit, 1979). More recently, there is some evidence from 
the same perspective that, by a process of assortative 
mating, some individuals inherit independent predispositions 
to alcoholism and or personality disorders (Bohman et al., 
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1984; Cadoret, O'Gorman, Troughton, & Heywood, 1985; 
Lorantger & Tulis, 1985; von Knorring, Cloninger, Bohman, & 
Sigvardsson, 1983). 
Several theories accounting for alcohol addiction 
suggest that alcohol is used to escape, or forget, painful 
emotional experiences (such as depressed, tense affect) 
rather than the drug primarily being used for its euphoria 
inducing quality. These theories stress the role of 
predisposing personality characteristics, such as avoidance, 
or unmet dependency needs (Freed, 1978). Focusing on the 
need to escape memories rather than a need to alter or escape 
current experience, Cowan (1983) tested the hypothesis that 
alcohol may permit the drinker to forget his previous 
feelings, both good and bad, rather than make him feel 
euphoric. He hypothesized that the primary action of alcohol 
on the emotional system may be to reduce the impact of past 
experience by blocking emotional memories and associated 
cognitions, keeping them from intruding on current 
experience. This would allow current experience to change in 
accordance to the drinkers expectations and the drinking 
situation, rather than being dominated by previous emotional 
experience. According to Cowan (1983): 
Euphoric and dysphoric current feelings of various 
types, as well as increased emotional !ability and 
"disinhibition," can all result from a drug-induced 
impairment (operationally, a decrease in accuracy) of 
memory for particular kinds of feelings. For the sober 
problem drinker, many of these memories are related to 
his problems, and are therefore unpleasant; forgetting 
these may be particularly reinforcing. (p.41). 
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Cowan tested hypotheses related to his theory by using 
in vivo alcohol doses either during a learning session or a 
recall session. He randomly assigned 32 non-alcoholic 
students to one of four drug conditions over the two 
sessions: placebo-placebo, placebo-alcohol, alcohol-placebo, 
alcohol-alcohol. Each subject was administered the Profile 
of Mood States (POMS) (McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1971) five 
times: during session one before ingestion of drink, and at 
the end of the session; during session two before ingestion 
of drink, another for current mood at the end of the session, 
and a final measure reflecting the subject's memory of the 
POMS given at the end of the previous session. The POMS is a 
checklist containing 65 mood adjectives on six scales: 
Tension-Anxiety, Depression-Dejection, Anger-Hostility, 
Vigor, Fatigue, and Confusion-Bewilderment. 
During each session, subjects participated in several 
intentional verbal and pictorial memory tasks including free 
recall of a word lists after one exposure, or several 
exposures, and four-alternative forced-choice recognition of 
pictures of men's faces. None of the verbal and pictorial 
memory tests resulted in significant effects due to alcohol 
before testing, or before learning. Alcohol produced no 
significant changes in feelings of any of the POMS scales. 
However, there were significant differences in 
affective memory, as measured by the subjects' accuracy in 
reconstructing previous POMS ratings. Cowan divided memory 
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error into two kinds: memory bias, or signed error in 
estimates of the intensity of previous emotions; and 
inaccuracy, or absolute error. Both bias and inaccuracy 
effects of alcohol ingestion on affective memories were 
demonstrated. Persons given alcohol during incidental 
learning of moods (session one) exaggerated angry affect at 
session two significantly more than other subjects. Alcohol 
ingestion during the learning session caused significantly 
more inaccuracy on four of the six moods scales (Confusion, 
Vigor, Depression-Dejection, and Tension-Anxiety, in order of 
most inaccuracy). Alcohol given before testing increased 
inaccuracy for moods even more strongly, significantly 
effecting Fatigue, Confusion, and Vigor, in descending order. 
One significant interaction of learning and testing states 
was in contrast to what might have been expected if 
state-dependent retrieval had occurred: the same drug 
condition groups showed less accurate memory for Vigor than 
those that changed condition across sessions. When Cowan 
computed a "Total Memory Inaccuracy Score" by adding the 
absolute value differences between learning and test session 
POM's across the six scales, alcohol produced significant 
effects both during learning and testing. 
Cowan considers this study to be "the first study, 
performed with a well established and extensively validated 
mood scale, which demonstrates that alcohol directly affects 
memory for feelings" (Cowan, 1983, p. 45). He cites five 
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lines of evidence from his experiment which indicate that 
alcohol has specific and selective effects on memory for 
emotional events beyond the general performance impairment 
known to be caused by alcohol ingestion: 1) Alcohol's effects 
on memory accuracy are stronger than those on memory bias; 2) 
Alcohol has different pattern of effects on emotional memory 
than on verbal and pictorial memory; 3) Alcohol's effects on 
both learning and testing conditions are specific to certain 
mood scales; 4) Alcohol induced inaccuracy for moods does 
not parallel the normal forgetting curve over time, therefore 
alcohol does not merely potentiate the effects of time on 
memory for moods; and 5) Alcohol does not alter current 
feelings while impairing memory for earlier emotional events. 
Cowan's research is important in that it attempts to 
directly measure the psychopharmacological impact of alcohol 
on memory for moods in order to establish a etiology for 
pathological drinking that takes into account much that is 
known clinically about the personalities of alcoholics. 
However, procedural and measurement problems inherent in his 
research has caused some workers to cast doubt on his conclu-
sions. His data have, in fact, been analyzed in a manner to 
support the hypothesis that alcohol enhances memory for the 
affect current immediately before the ingestion of alcohol 
(Mueller & Klajner, 1984), supporting the view that persons 
most at risk for alcoholism feel their best immediately before 
intoxication (Parker, Birnbaum, Weingartner, 1980). 
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If Cowan is correct, however, and alcohol use is at 
least p·artially motivated by the reinforcing effects of 
memory impairment, it is possible that depressive realism as 
described by Alloy and Abramson (1979) has a causal role in 
the development of some cases of alcoholism. The 
asymmetrical effects of alcohol on different kinds of 
affective memories and the asymmetry of mood selectivity 
effects on memory may also have a role in the development of 
some variants of alcoholism. Depressed persons may be 
particularly vulnerable to the abuse of alcohol in order to 
take advantage of its specific effects on affective memories, 
which otherwise would intrude on ongoing experience, 
unaltered by self-protective biases. Some cases of 
alcoholism, then, might result from alcohol use during 
attempts at self-medication for excessive realism related to 
depression. 
Several theories have been reviewed to account for the 
apparently high incidence of depression in alcoholics. Some 
investigatiors view this high incidence of depressive 
symptoms as being related to the phase of the illness in 
which alcoholics are apt to present for treatment. They 
suggest that alcoholics obtain treatment at times of reaching 
"rock bottom", that is when severe physical and emotional 
symptoms result in acute depression and distress that soon 
lifts after detoxification. A biomedical perspective 
suggests that depression and alcoholism have a common 
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physiological, perhaps genetic, basis that may also be 
related to the development of personality disorders. 
Personality traits predisposing individuals to both 
alcoholism and depression have been suggested, such as 
dependency, interpersonal ambivalence, and avoidance. 
Finally, a theory related directly to alcohol's impact on 
memory for affects was reviewed, suggesting that alcoholism 
may result from reliance on alcohol to prevent intrusion of 
negative affects, including depressed affect, into ongoing 
experience. 
Depression and Cognitive Performance 
Hasher, Rose, Zacks, Sanft and Doren (1985) proposed 
that there are two independent frameworks that make 
predictions about the impact of depressed mood on performance 
in the memory field. One framework is based on limits in 
capacity for cognitive tasks (Kahneman, 1973) with depression 
reducing total capacity, or causing additional demands on 
available capacity (Hasher & Zacks, 1979). The second 
framework emphasizes the use of mood as a organizing 
principle for processing new information and guiding 
retrieval of memories (Beck, 1967; Kuiper, MacDonlad, & 
Derry, 1983; Teasdale, 1986). The solid empirical findings 
supporting each framework are discussed under separate 
sub-headings below. 
Reduction of Cognitive Capacity Due to Depression 
The cognitive literature on depression contains 
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widespread reports that may be interpreted as declines of 
capacity due to depression, including deficits in problem 
solving, memory, and rate of learning (Dobson & Dobson,-1981; 
Cohen, Weingartner, Smallberg, Pickar, & Murphy, 1982; 
Stromgren, 1977; Weingartner, Cohen, Murphy, Martello, & 
Gerdt, 1981). 
Specifically in alcoholics, some investigators note 
that it is often difficult to separate the effects of 
clinical depression and neurological impairment (Gass & 
Russell, 1986; Hesserlbrock, Hesserlbrock, Meyer & Workman, 
1983). Both depression and a history of alcohol abuse have 
been demonstrated to lower both new learning and immediate 
memory on psychological tests (Query & Megran, 1984). Recent 
investigations (Clark & Teasdale, 1982; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; 
Riskind, Rholes, & Eggers, 1982) suggest that depressed mood 
alone may interfere with the retrieval of positive (pleasant) 
memories from Long Term Memory (LTM). A more recent study 
using more neutral materials (the Digit Span subtest from the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale-Revised and the Logical Memory 
subtest from the Wechsler Memory Scale) found little 
additional impact of depression above that of organicity, 
including organicity due to alcohol abuse. The investigators 
concluded that the clinical lore associating depression with 
memory impairment is mainly due to the exaggerated memory 
complaints of depressed patients (Gass & Russell, 1986). 
Gass and Russell reached a conclusion that appears to 
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overlook the possibility that the neutral stimuli used by the 
investigators would be least likely to uncover distortions 
related to depression, which may be strongest when materials 
are emotionally charged and personally relevant. These are 
the factors emphasized in the second major framework for 
understanding the effects of depression on memory: the mood 
selectivity framework. 
Mood Selectivity Effects on Memory 
Bower's (1980) work on mood and memory has proved 
seminal in investigating the relationship between mood and 
memory from the second framework described by Hasher et al. 
(1985), that of mood as an organizing principle for encoding 
and retrieval of memory contents. Bower used hypnosis and 
reading of emotionally charged self-reference statements to 
induce happy or sad mood states prior to a memory task. He 
demonstrated that persons so induced had better recall for 
material that was similar in evaluative content to their mood 
state. He has labeled this effect of better recall of 
mood-congruent material a "mood-state- dependent memory" 
effect. Salience of material that is similar in content to 
the induced mood has been demonstrated by Bower and 
associated workers, and has been labeled "the mood congruity 
.effect" (Bower, 1981). Bower frames his work as an extension 
of the Availability Heuristic Theory, and defined both 
mood-state-dependent memory effects a~d mood congruity 
effects as "automatic''. His work is thus in part an 
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extension of two theoretical perspectives used in the 
preliminary study (Automatic Processing Theory and 
Availability Heuristic Theory) by the inclusion of the 
effects of mood on memory. Although not of direct relevance 
here, state dependent learning has been used in some models 
to explain the addictive process and the unfolding of 
affective memories in psychotherapy (Liard, Wagener, Halal & 
Szegda, 1982). 
In an experiment investigating memory for personal 
episodes, Bower and associates had subjects record emotional 
events in a diary for one week. At the end of the week 
period, hypnosis was used to induce either a pleasant or 
unpleasant mood in subjects according to random assignment. 
When subjects were asked to recall recorded emotional events, 
the number of incidents recalled depended on the original 
rating of the incident by the subject (either pleasant or 
unpleasant) and the manipulated mood state at time or recall. 
Percent of recall was highest for the unpleasant mood 
condition for both kinds of incidents. In both mood state 
conditions, recall for incidents that had the same mood 
content as the manipulated recall condition was much higher. 
This effect was stronger in the pleasant mood condition, with 
subjects recalling 92% more pleasant than unpleasant moods. 
In the unpleasant mood condition the bias was less severe; 
subjects recalled only 52% more unpleasant incidents than 
pleasant incidents. 
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Recently the generalizability of these mood dependent 
effects has been called in question. In a. series of three 
experiments, Hasher, Rose, Zacks, and Doren (1985) attempted 
to clarify whether depression reduces overall capacity, 
whether mood congruent selectivity occurs, and if so, at what 
point in the memory process (encoding or retrieval) 
selectivity operates. The methodology differed in these 
experiments from other investigations in the mood and memory 
with normal subjects in that the BDI and MCL were used to 
form groups of naturally occurring depressed mood, rather 
than resorting to some experimental induction of mood states. 
The results across all three experiments were that no 
significant differences were found between mildly depressed 
college students and nondepressed students on recall of 
verbal material of differing mood contents. 
Bower and Mayer (1985a) have also reported a failure to 
replicate mood congruent recall, using the original 
methodology (Bower, Monteiro, & Gilligan (1978). This failure 
contradicted Bower's (1981) theory of mood as an active 
retrieval cue and led the authors to view mood dependent 
recall "an evanescent will-o-the- wisp, and not the robust 
outcome suggested by earlier reports." (Bower & Mayer, 1985a, 
p.42). Isen (1985) and Ellis (1985), commenting on these 
failures to replicate, have stressed the importance of both a 
possible asymmetrical effect for positive mood and negative 
mood on memory, with negative mood having a less powerful 
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selectivity effect than positive mood (Isen, Shalker, Clark, 
& Karp, 1978), and the absence of a true continuity of mood 
from clinical depression to mildly depressed college 
students. Hasher et al., (1985) do not view their findings 
as evidence against mood congruent effects in clinical 
populations, but as a caveat about the consistency of such 
effects at a lower level in normals. 
More recently, Bower and Mayer (1985b) have disagreed 
with these critiques, arguing that differences in methods 
between the experimental use of naturally occurring moods and 
manipulated mood is a potent factor obscuring the detection 
of such effects in a normal college population. Also, 
according to their model of spreading activation of 
associates, it is the present mood state that is expected to 
result in mood congruent effects, and Bower and Mayer suggest 
that the BDI and MAACL used by Hasher et al., (1985) are, in 
part, trait measures of personality. 
In an article examining the relationship between mood 
state and severity of psychopathology in depression and 
mania, Johnson and Magaro (1987) provided some interesting 
concepts related to this debate. In their review of the 
literature, they found trends indicating unsystematic 
cognitive disruption in mania, and increased severity of 
pathology leading to increased memory deficit in both 
depression and mania. They found depressive performance on 
recognition tasks as characterized by a conservative response 
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bias, indicating that depressives had more stringent response 
criteria for reporting recognition than did nondepressed 
persons. In regard to selectivity effects they concluded 
that mood, not clinical depression, exerts the most profound 
influence on the content of material recalled, cutting across 
diagnostic categories. They conceptualized mood and severity 
of affective disorder as discrete entities, although related. 
Mood state may function in a somewhat autonomous manner from 
diagnosis with regard to recall in memory. They viewed mood 
as analogous to a train yard switchman, determining the 
direction of the "train of thought": 
Therefore, memory content is hypothesized to be 
determined by two dimensions, mood state and severity 
of psychopathology. Both produce their effect by 
altering the manner in which information is processed 
--mood by providing contextual cues and schema 
activation, severity through low levels of effort and 
the disruptive effects of the presence or severity of 
psychiatric illness. In addition, we can further 
hypothesize a relation between memory content in con-
sciousness and mood, such that a positive feedback 
loop is created (Beck, 1967; Bower,1981). That is, 
mood increases the likelihood that thoughts present in 
consciousness will be congruent with hedonic (mood) 
state, which in turn will affect mood state such that 
these thoughts will intensify the mood.(Johnson & 
Magaro, 1987, p. 38). 
In the terminology used earlier in this review, Johnson 
and Margaro are suggesting that current mood influences 
content and results in selectivity, whereas severity of 
psychopathology influences capacity. The current study 
adopts a similar view of the independence of mood and 
diagnostic severity by separating state depression from trait 
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depression. In addition to the capacity reducing effects of 
depression, the present study incorporates the effects of 
depressive realism on memory, to be described with the 
learned helplessness literature, later in this review. 
Depression and Memory for Freguency of Occurrences 
Several studies have been conducted to investigate the 
impact of depression on memory for frequency of occurrences, 
often combining concepts and methods from both frameworks 
described by Hasher et al. (1985). Studies of contingency of 
reinforcement can also be considered frequency studies, in 
the sense that the subject's ability to distinguish the 
frequency of reinforcement in the contexts of various rates 
and types of responding are the focus of investigation. From 
this point of view, Alloy and Abramson's (1979) investigation 
of perception of contingency in depression is a frequency 
study, although the emphasis is on learning (especially 
abstraction and generalization) rather than on·memory. 
Perhaps the most influential investigation of the effects of 
depression on frequency information from a memory framework 
(with the emphasis on encoding and retrieval) is that of 
Hasher and Zacks (1979). 
Hasher and Zacks (1979) classified subjects as 
depressed or nondepressed from scores on the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI). Pictures of common objects were presented 
at controlled frequencies over eight study trials. Study 
trials were alternated with imaginary trials to determine if 
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the occurrence of imagined events would influence frequency 
estimation of presented objects. Results showed no 
differences between depressed and nondepressed persons .. 
Also, imagined trials increased the estimate of frequency 
similarly in both .groups. The authors concluded that 
depression does not influence the ability to accurately 
estimate event frequency. 
Based on this finding related to depression and other 
findings of no effect on memory for frequency of performance 
on a large number of subject variables, and learning 
conditions, Hasher and Zacks (1979) proposed that frequency 
for memory of occurrences is one of several "automatic 
processes" that place minimal demands on the capacity of the 
cognitive processing system, and therefore are not influenced 
by reductions in capacity, as are more capacity demanding 
processes (named "effortful" or "controlled" processes in 
their framework). 
In an earlier attempt to clarify issues of capacity and 
mood selectivity effects for depressed affect specifically 
for memory for frequency of occurrences (the type of memory 
investigated in the present study); Curt (1982) categorized 
studies of frequency into two types: "frequency studies" and 
"depression studies". The primary focus of frequency 
studies, in her typology, is the ability to make absolute or 
relative judgments about the occurrence of specific stimuli, 
using innocuous, neutral stimuli, usually ~l nature . 
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Depression studies, on the other hand, use emotionally-
charged events, feedback about performance, personally 
relevant stimuli, and require judgments about the occurrence 
of categories or types of items rather than individual item 
frequency. In a study designed to investigate the findings 
of the two kinds of studies by combining all of their 
elements into one design (using pleasant, neutral, and 
unpleasant self-statements, category judgments and item 
frequency judgments) she found that depressed subjects (as 
determined by BDI scores) did not differ significantly from 
non-depressed subjects, either in the recall of items, or in 
the accuracy of their judgments. She interpreted the absence 
of differences as being due to the non-reinforcing quality of 
her stimuli (self-reference statements). 
Another possibility for the absence of findings of 
differences between depressed and nondepressed subjects in 
this study (as well as Hasher & Zacks, 1979) is the use of 
the BDI to form a "depressed" group from non-clinical college 
students. Recent research suggests that the BDI is not 
appropriate for this purpose, due to its vulnerability to 
social desirability effects and low correlation with 
independent measures of depression (Tanka-Matsumi & Kameoka, 
1986). Hasher et al. (1985) suggests that a non-clinical 
population is not appropriate for investigating naturally 
occurring mood state and memory selectivity effects. Also 
Bower and Mayer's (1985b) proposition that mood biasing 
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effects would most likely be detected using state measures is 
relevant here. 
The literature on the effects of depressed affect· on 
cognitive performance have been reviewed from the point of 
view of memory. The typical findings in this area of 
research have been shown to be related to two guiding 
theoretical frameworks. Two major interpretations of the 
clinical relevance of these findings (learned helplessness 
and depressive realism) will be reviewed in further detail. 
Learned Helplessness Theory and Depressive Realism 
The learned helplessness theory of depression is based 
on the similarities between naturally occurring depression in 
humans and human performance under conditions of being 
exposed to noncontingent adversive events (Maier & Seligman, 
1976; Seligman, 1976, 1975). Under conditions of 
noncontingent adversity, humans and animals behave as if they 
have learned that their responding does not matter. They 
display a reduced incentive for initiating voluntary 
responses and appear to show cognitive deficits in learning 
future response-outcome contingencies. Organisms that have 
learned that outcomes are not contingently related to 
responses, according to the learned helplessness theory, 
demonstrate emotional disturbances similar to depression 
(Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Miller, Rosellini, & 
Seligman, 1977; Seligman, 1975a, 1975b; Seligman, Klein, & 
Miller, 1976). 
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Learned helplessness theory predicts that depressed 
subjects will underestimate the degree of contingency between 
outcomes and their personal responses. Seligman and his 
colleagues have tested this prediction by means of the 
chance-skill method, a method involving a series of tasks 
with outcomes that appear to be determined by either chance 
or skill. After performing several trials at each kind of 
task, subjects report their expectations about future trials. 
The typical finding in studies using this method is that 
outcomes that appear to be dependent on responses have a 
greater impact on expectancies for future success than chance 
determined outcomes. 
For example, Miller and Seligman (1976) exposed college 
students to noise under three conditions: contingent noise, 
noncontingent noise, and no noise. In a later task with 
contingent conditions, students exposed to noncontingent 
noise showed less expectancy change toward success than other 
students, which the authors interpreted as resulting from a 
generalized learned expectancy of response-outcome 
independence. Similarly, depressed subjects have shown less 
change toward expectancy of success after both success and 
failure at a task than nondepressed subjects (Klein & 
Seligman, 1976); and unipolar depressives have shown smaller 
expectancy changes in a contingent task relative to other 
hospitali~ed control subjects and schizophrenics (Abramson et 
a1., 1978). 
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In an investigation of the learned helplessness model 
of depression in an alcoholic population, O'Leary, Donovan, 
Kreger, and Cysewski (1978) advanced reasons for their choice 
of this population to investigate depression similar to the 
reason advanced in the present study for viewing depression 
as a factor in memory biases in alcoholics: 
Alcoholics were chosen due to the high relation 
between depression and this disorder (Weingold, Lachin, 
Bell, & Coxe, 1968), the similarity between the 
self-reported affect described by alcoholics and 
depressives (Gibson & Becker, 1973), and the apparent 
applicability of the learned helplessness model to this 
population. (p. 111). 
Sixty-two male alcoholics in an inpatient rehabilita-
tion unit were divided into low, medium, and high depression 
groups based on Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) scores. 
Procedures identical to those used by Miller and Seligman 
(1973) were employed to create chance and skill tasks wherein 
success or failure could be manipulated covertly by the 
experimenters. The chance condition consisted of a task 
requiring the subject to predict which of two letters would 
appear on a slide projector screen. The skill condition 
involved the manipulating of a string by the subject in an 
attempt to raise a platform without causing a ball to fall 
from its resting position on the platform. Success was 
controlled covertly by means of an electromagnet attached to 
the platform and a metal strip attached to the ball. In the 
38 
chance condition success was manipulated by the experimenter 
covertly choosing the advance or backward switch on the slide 
projector. 
Five dependent measures for each task condition were 
developed to measure changes in expectancy : (a) an initial 
expectancy of success self-rating, performed before the first 
trial on a zero to ten scale, with zero indicating certainty 
of failure, and ten indicating certainty of success; (b) The 
difference in expectancy after the first trial; (c) The total 
value of "appropriate expectancy shifts" across ten trials 
(i.e., the sum of increases in expectancies after a success 
and decreases of expectancies after failures); (d) the total 
value of "inappropriate" shifts across trials (summed 
increases in expectancies after a failure and decreases of 
expectancies after success: an equivalent to the "gambler's 
fallacy"); (e) the final expectancy after all trials. 
Successes and failures were alternated, resulting in each 
subject beginning with a success trial and ending in a 
failure trial. 
Unlike the results of Miller and Seligman (1973) 
(wherein depressed college students showed consistently lower 
expectancy shifts of the types described above) the only 
significant differences were for task condition and end 
expectancy. The skill task condition resulted in 
significantly higher expectancies for all levels of 
depression. Alcoholics with lower levels of depression had 
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significantly higher end expectancies than those with higher 
levels of depression. Two significant correlations (£ <.OS) 
of dependent measures with depression score were found: that 
with initial expectancy (£ = -.28), and that with end 
expectancy (r = -.25). The investigators concluded: 
Contrary to Miller and Seligman's (1973) results and 
Klein and Seligman's (1976) contention, present 
findings do not support the direct applicability of the 
learned helplessness model to a population of depressed 
subjects with other forms of psychopathology. While 
the self-reported affective features are apparently 
similar between alcoholics and depressives (Gibson & 
Becker, 1973); the present sample of depressed 
alcoholics did not evidence the response-outcome 
independent deficits in the skill task as previously 
demonstrated by Miller and Seligman (1973) among 
college students. (p. 112.) 
Recognizing the challenge to his theory inherent in 
these findings, Seligman (1978) requested that O'Leary 
reanalyze the data using MMPI Hypomania scale as a controlled 
variable to "purify" the BDI depression measure. In a 
personal communication, O'Leary informed Seligman that after 
using post hoc blocking, the high-manic/high depressed 
subjects demonstrated significantly higher expectancy shifts 
than did low-manic/high depressed subjects, and that 
depressed alcoholics showed higher initial expectancies and 
final expectancies and are "more unrealistically optimistic 
than matched depressives who are not alcoholic. 11 (Seligman, 
1978, p.168). Seligman interpreted these findings as 
consistent with the learned helplessness modeling of 
expectancy in depression. 
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Seligman was correct in perceiving a threat to the 
relevance of learned helplessness to understanding depressed 
alcoholics in O'Leary et al.'s (1978) study, but may actually 
be increasing that threat by his requested reanalysis. A 
reinterpretation of O'Leary et al.'s findings based on a 
critique of the experiment's dependent measures, and the 
relationship between expectancy and contingency clarifies the 
consistency of the original results and the subsequent 
reanalysis with the description of depressive realism later 
offered by Alloy and Abramson (1978). Such a critique and 
reinterpretation are as follows: 
In the described method, noncontingent outcomes 
alternate in pairs, making the actual probability of success 
(or failure) equal to .5. Expectancy should be influenced 
by contingency if subjects are responding "realistically". 
Therefore, a totally realistic expectancy in the described 
experiment, would be 5 on the described self-rating scale: 
reflecting the actual probability of positive reinforcement 
(.5) and the amount of control (none). A criticism made 
against many learned helplessness studies is relevant in this 
case. In both task conditions, outcomes are noncontingent: 
the subjects are in fact helpless, yet expectancies which 
appear to reflect recognition of this fact are interpreted as 
due to a pathogenic process, learned helplessness. 
The dependent measures of expectancy change were 
designed to detect biases in the direction predicted by 
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Seligman's theory, not to detect changes in expectancy as 
reflections of accurate perception of contingency and rate of 
reinforcement. The raw expectancy means, however, are more 
useful for examining expectancy as a reflection of 
contingency and frequency of reward. Assuming that initial 
expectancy (with no knowledge of the task) may reflect 
subject optimism, or pessimism more accurate perceptions of 
contingency should have resulted in end expectancy means 
closer to the self-rating scale mean of 5 than initial 
expectancy means. Inspection of the reported expectancy 
means and correlations indicate that subjects with higher 
levels of depression had end expectancies significantly 
different than subjects with lower levels of depression, and 
that were more consistent with contingency: i.e. were closer 
to the expectancy scale mean of 5. This was true in both 
task conditions, but more strongly the case for the skill 
condition. The link between contingency and expectancy may 
be as strong in the chance condition, but because of the 
transparent lack of contingency in what could be described to 
be a task of clairvoyance or telepathy, there was almost no 
difference between the high depressed subjects' initial and 
end expectancies, reflecting the maintenance of their initial 
accurate perception of contingency. In both conditions, 
(wherein both the paraphernalia and outcomes approximate 
events in a typical carnival game of chance} the higher end 
expectancy means for the less depressed subjects may reflect 
these subjects' greater inability or unwillingness to 
perceive the underlying contingency realistically. 
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Seligman, in his comments on this study, (1978) did 
not report the expectancy means of the requested reanalysis 
with hypomania as a controlled variable, and did not make it 
clear how the comparison with non-alcoholic depressives was 
accomplished (O'Leary et al.'s study included only alcoholic 
subjects). This leaves open the possibility that the 
low-manic/high-depressed subjects were more realistic than 
the high-manic/high-depressed subjects, if the former's lower 
expectancy shifts were toward the scale mean of 5, reflecting 
more ac~urate perception of the prevailing contingency and 
frequency of reinforcement. 
Note that this study (O'Leary et al, 1978) challenges 
the learned helplessness model and is consistent with the 
description of depressive realism that later emerged from 
such findings. Alloy and Abramson's (1979) article was 
seminal in suggesting that such findings may be related to 
the absence in depressed subjects of normal selfprotective 
biases. 
Working within the framework of studying contingency of 
reinforcement in learning, Alloy and Abramson garnered 
evidence that raised serious challenges to the learned 
helplessness model of depression. In a set of four 
experiments designed to investigate the relationship between 
actual and perceived reinforcement, they examined depressed 
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and nondepressed students' abilities to detect the degree of 
contingency in a task under differing conditions of outcome 
frequency and desirability. Severity of depression was. 
determined by use of the BDI. 
In Experiment 1, the task used was making a green light 
come on by the pressing of a button. Each subject performed 
different "problems" in estimating contingency (amount of 
control) and rate of reinforcement (the lighting of the green 
bulb) using this task, having been told that control and 
number of green lights might vary between problems. Subjects 
were later asked to make judgments of the percent of control 
(contingency) they had over the light coming on. In the 
Experiment 1, the reinforcement was manipulated mechanically 
to be negatively related to the actual degree of contingency, 
which varied among the three problems performed by subjects. 
Contrary to the predictions of the learned helplessness 
model, ratings of contingency by the subjects were found to 
be highly accurate, with no significant differences between 
depressed and nondepressed subjects. 
In Experiment 2, the subjects' task was the same, but 
the experimental goal was to assess judgments of 
noncontingency rather than contingency as in Experiment 1. 
The learned helplessness model also predicted that depressed 
persons would be accurate in assessing noncontingency, 
whereas nondepressed persons would overestimate contingency. 
Rates of reinforcement differed across problems in this 
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experiment, but were noncontingent on subject responses. It 
was found that depressed persons were accurate in their 
assessment of noncontingency regardless of level of 
reinforcement. Nondepressed persons, however, overestimated 
contingency under high rates of reinforcement, but not under 
conditions of low reinforcement (this trend being more 
powerful for males than females), thus apparently providing 
partial support for the learned helplessness model. 
Experiment 3 was designed to further examine the 
illusion of control found among nondepressives in Experiment 
2. The task in this experiment was similar except the green 
light was now associated with the gain or loss of money. In 
one problem, the light signified a 25¢ loss from an initial 
$5 provided by the experimenter (lose problem). In the other 
problem, the light signified a 25¢ gain (win problem}. 
Frequency of reinforcement was held constant across problems. 
The Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL) (Zuckerman & 
Lubin, 1965) was used in combination with the BDI to form 
depressed and nondepressed groups. In addition the MAACL was 
administered again both before and after each problem to 
assess affect changes related to the rate of reinforcement 
under noncontingency, yielding a depression change score, a 
hostility change score, and an anxiety change score. 
Depressed subjects accurately detected noncontingency of 
their responses, whereas nondepressed people demonstrated 
illusions of control. Both groups judged reinforcement to be 
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higher in the win problem. Both groups showed significant 
change toward dysphoria in the lose situation, with 
nondepressed subjects showing greater change in the dysphoric 
direction in the lose situation, and depressed subjects 
showing greater change in the euphoric direction in the win 
situation. The investigators concluded from these findings 
that under conditions of noncontingency involving hedonistic 
rewards nondepressed subjects err by overestimating both 
contingency and outcome frequency. 
In Experiment 4, the learned helplessness model 
hypothesis that depressed subjects would underestimate 
contingency relative to nondepressed subjects under 
hedonistic reward conditions was tested. The procedure was 
similar to experiment 3, but contingency was set at 50% in 
both problems. It was found that depressed subjects were 
more accurate than nondepressed subjects in judging 
contingency of reward. Nondepressed subjects overestimated 
control in the win problem (especially when the active 
strategy of pushing a button was most effective) and greatly 
underestimated control in the lose problem, whereas depressed 
subjects were accurate about the degree of control regardless 
as to amount of contingency or the kind of response that was 
most effective in gaining reinforcement (actively hitting the 
button, or passively not hitting it and waiting for 
reinforcement). 
Across all four experiments the learned helplessness 
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hypotheses that depressed persons would underestimate control 
and that nondepressed persons will overestimate control were 
not supported. Depressed subjects were consistently accurate 
in their estimates of control, while nondepressed subjects 
showed both illusions of control and illusions of no control 
depending on experimental conditions. 
Alloy and Abramson (1979) proposed a revision of the 
learned helplessness model that would incorporate these 
findings. The revised hypothesis maintains that there is a 
motivational deficit in depression that works without 
perceptual distortion, that is depressives are less apt to 
initiate successful responses, but are not less able to 
perceive what the required response would be. The revised 
hypothesis predicts that depressed subjects will initiate 
fewer instrumental responses when the required response is 
complex, due to their motivational impairment. The 
helplessness experienced by depressives, according to the new 
model, is not entirely due to the experience of 
noncontingency filtered through perceptual, attributional, 
and expectational processes, but may also result from 
hormonal and physiological sources. 
An alternative framework was also proposed to account 
for the fact that nondepressives were inaccurate in 
assessments of contingency. Self-esteem maintenance and self 
enhancement are the cornerstones of this alternative view. 
The results in all four of Alloy and Abramson's (1979) 
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seminal experiments can be explained if one hypothesizes that 
nondepressed persons are motivated to maintain their 
self-esteem, whereas depressed persons are not. Roots to 
this viewpoint include Bibring (1953) who argued that 
depressives are not motivated to retain self-esteem because 
the mechanism for self-deception has broken down. 
Depressives have taken off their rose colored glasses, and 
are "sadder but wiser" according to Alloy and Abramson 
(1979). The literature on self-esteem is consistent with the 
view that persons with low self-esteem lack protective 
perceptual biases. Zuckerman (1979) concluded that 
self-esteem is maintained by the kind of self-serving 
attributional biases seen in nondepressed subjects. An 
attributional style of evenhandedness (willingness to 
attribute success or failure equally to either the task 
situation of to the self) has also been observed among 
subjects with low self-esteem (Fitch, 1970; Ickes & Layden, 
1978; Tennen, Herzberger, & Nelson, 1986). 
The direction of the causal link between depression and 
helplessness is still under debate in the depressive realism 
literature. Building on the revised version of the learned 
helplessness model of depression which emphasizes the 
perception and generalized expectancy of noncontingency in 
the development of depression, Schwartz (1981, 1982) has 
argued that helplessness can not lead to any form of 
depression because non-depressed persons do not experience 
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noncontingency even when it is present. According to his 
view, depression causes helplessness by producing a deficit 
in initiating formal hypotheses about ongoing experiences, 
and therefore preventing the usual bias toward confirmation 
that accompanies hypothesis testing (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1973). According to Schwartz, it is actually an "inferential 
handicap" that makes depressives appear "wiser". He cites a 
series of experiments by Reber (1967, 1968, 1976) 
demonstrating that incidental learning of patterns and 
abstract principles can be superior to intentional learning 
of the same ideas, because of the distorting influences of 
confirmation biases evoked by hypotheses generated by 
subjects under intentional learning conditions. He views the 
depressed person as similarly operating permanently under 
conditions of incidental learning because of a failure to 
initiate hypotheses about the learning situation. At least 
one empirical study investigating the role of hypothesis 
testing in judgments of contingency by depressive and 
nondepressives supports Schwartz's view, in that depressed 
subjects demonstrated the same biases as nondepressed persons 
after they were provided hypotheses to test in relationship 
to their judgments of contingency (Abramson, Alloy, & 
Rosnoff, 1982). 
Abramson and Alloy (1981) do not subscribe to this 
view, but see the optimistic biases of nondepressives as a 
pervasive aspect of human cognition that accounts for their 
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inability to perceive noncontingency. To them the depressive 
does not possess a depressogenic bias: "but rather that he or 
she suffers from an absence of nondepressive cognitive bias" 
(Abramson & Alloy, 1981, p.444). Recently, however, Abramson 
and Seligman along with other researchers (Raps et al., 
1982) have presented evidence that a depressogenic 
attributional style (attributing causality of negative events 
to internal, stable, and global causes) may lead to both 
helplessness and to depression. 
The present study addresses several issues raised in 
the reviewed literature. The high incidence of depression 
among alcoholics suggests that some cases of alcoholism may 
result from depression. One line of investigation suggests 
that the specific influences of alcohol on affective memories 
may reinforce the abuse of alcohol among persons with 
intrusive negative emotional memories, including memories of 
depressed affect. The literature on depression and cognitive 
performance outlines several results of depressed affect on 
and memory. Total capacity may be reduced, resulting in 
inaccuracy of memory. Biased processing toward a depressive 
world view may occur, resulting an increase of negative 
emotional contents in memory. The failure to produce 
self-protective biases may cause depressed persons (and 
therefore alcoholics that are depressed) to be more realistic 
about previous events than others. Considered together, the 
reviewed research findings and theoretical formulations 
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suggest that depression may have potent effects on memory, 
and that differences in memory performance between alcoholics 
and nonalcoholics that were demonstrated in the preliminary 
study might be explained by differences in levels of 
depression between the two groups. 
CHAPTER III 
THE PRESENT STUDY 
General Assumptions 
Although differing explanations of the relative 
objectivity of depressed persons in various learning 
situations continue to exist, the findings in the literature 
described earlier are very similar to some of the findings in 
the preliminary study. The present study will investigate 
the role of depression in memory differences between 
alcoholics and nonalcoholics, by testing predictions based on 
viewing depression as a mediator of cognitive biases and a 
moderator of apparent cognitive deficits. In order to do 
this, a very complex interaction of many variables will be 
limited to a focus on only a few. Therefore, all systematic 
error will be viewed as related to the effects of level of 
depression (or conversely to the level of positive affect) 
although there may be other sources of bias. Similarly, all 
unsystematic error will be viewed as related to cognitive 
impairments, as was the case in the preliminary study. 
The hypotheses to be tested assume two separate but 
related depressive processes acting on memory and cognitive 
strategies related to memory tasks. None of the memory or 
bias measures is expected to be solely influenced by one 
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process and not the other. Instead, each hypothesis about 
the effects of depression requires an assessment of the 
relevance of trait depression relative to the effects of 
current depressed mood in the particular memory production in 
question. In general, the effects of depression on memory 
are expected to be stronger than state depression effects. 
Trait depression is expected to interfere with self-
protective biases, which minimize negative events and 
maximize positive events in memory, whereas state depression 
is expected to increase depressive biases which maximize 
negative events in memory. Trait depression is seen as 
primarily disruptive and limiting of normal cognitive 
processes, whereas state depression is seen as primarily 
productive of mood specific bias effects. 
Alcoholics are expected to have a greater frequency of 
negative affect over two weeks than the nonalcoholic 
subjects, due to trait depression. Trait depression and 
(less significantly) cognitive inflexibility related to 
cognitive impairments are expected to result in alcoholic 
subjects having less mood variability over two weeks. Trait 
related depression effects are expected to result in higher 
accuracy due to depressive realism, which in this context is 
assumed to be due to the failure of self-protective biases. 
A related prediction is made that the extremes of emotions 
experienced by subjects will have less of a distorting impact 
on memory for alcoholic subjects than for nonalcoholic 
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subjects. The nonalcoholics, on the other hand, are expected 
to have greater distortions in memory toward depicting the 
self as happier, more confident, and secure, i.e., to 
demonstrate self-protective bias. 
State related depression is predicted to result in 
overestimation of depressive content, resulting from the 
greater availability of depressive items, via mood 
selectivity effects on memory. State depression and, 
therefore, depressive bias is expected to be greater in the 
alcoholic group. The latter difference, moderated by trait 
depressive realism and resulting from a weaker process, is 
expected to be less dramatic and to be exhibited mainly in 
the overestimation of negative moods. This prediction is 
made because trait depression related realism about negative 
events and state depression selectivity for negative events 
are expected to combine, resulting in increased 
overestimation of negative moods. The preliminary study 
found that the groups did not differ significantly from each 
other on positive mood item occurrence, but that the 
alcoholics had significantly more negative mood occurrences. 
Thus the selectivity effect for positive moods, although 
perhaps stronger than the selectivity effects of negative 
affect, is not expected to be different between groups, 
whereas the (perhaps weaker) selectivity effect of negative 
moods is expected to result in group differences in memory 
estimates. 
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The cognitive strategies used by subjects to perform 
the memory task are also investigated in the present study. 
Strategic processing of the memory task is assumed to be 
reflected in the order in which subjects performed sub-items 
of memory judgments about the occurrence of various bipolar 
mood states. Although the actual procedure used will be 
described more fully in the Methods section, an example using 
the bipolar item Happy-Sad will be used here to illustrate 
the concepts the strategic processing measures. Each bipolar 
mood item was divided into three sub-items: judgments of the 
rate of occurrence of positive affect (e.g., Happy), neutral 
affect (e.g., neither Happy nor Sad), and negative affect 
(e.g., Sad). For each of ten mood items, subjects chose to 
either perform the sub-items in the order presented on a 
printed form, or to perform them in another order. 
Deviations in sub-item performance from the order presented 
to the subject is assumed to be the result of strategic 
cognitive processing of the task. Differences in strategic 
processing are assumed to result in accuracy and bias 
differences by order of sub-item performance. Memory for 
frequency of occurrences will be viewed as a function 
requiring relatively low demands on cognitive capacity, i.e., 
will be considered an automatic process. Strategic 
processing is conceptualized here as a complex of cognitive 
functions requiring relatively higher demands on cognitive 
capacity, i.e., is considered a effortful process. 
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Depression and alcoholism are expected to have some 
negative impact on both amount of strategic processing and 
unsystematic memory error (due to decreased motivation and 
cognitive deficits respectively), but the present study will 
focus only on the effects of depression. Again, two separate 
depressive processes are assumed, with trait depression 
inhibiting any kind of processing, and state depression 
inhibiting a tendency to process information along the 
positive direction, i.e., to use the positive pole as the 
first, or anchoring sub-item. Although state depression is 
assumed to produce increased processing along the negative 
direction (i.e., to use the negative pole as the first, or 
anchoring sub-item) this effect is assumed to be weaker than 
the similar effect of positive mood, due to the asymmetrical 
nature of mood selectivity effects. 
Specific Hypotheses 
Trait Depression Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1. The alcoholic group will have a 
significantly higher level of depression than the 
nonalcoholic group, as measured by Scale 2 of the MMPI. 
Hypothesis 1· Alcoholic subjects will have 
significantly lower self-protective bias scores than 
nonalcoholic subjects. This difference will be significantly 
attributable to trait depression (measured by Scale 2 MMPI) 
as a mediating variable. 
Hypothesis 3. Alcoholic subjects will have 
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significantly lower absolute accuracy of memory than 
nonalcoholic subjects, after depression has been controlled. 
Hypothesis 4. Alcoholic subjects will have 
significantly higher rates of negative affective states on 
ESM records than nonalcoholic subjects. This difference will 
be significantly attributable to trait depression (measured 
by Scale 2 MMPI) as a mediating variable. 
Hypothesis 5. Alcoholic subjects will have 
significantly lower variation in moods on ESM records than 
nonalcoholic subjects. This difference will be significantly 
attributable to trait depression (measured by Scale 2 MMPI) 
as a mediating variable. 
Hypothesis 6. Alcoholic subjects will demonstrate in 
their estimates significantly less sensitivity to extremes of 
ESM mood state occurrence than will nonalcoholic subjects. 
This difference will be significantly attributable to trait 
depression (measured by Scale 2 MMPI) as a mediating 
variable. 
State Depression Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 7. The alcoholic group will have a 
significantly higher level of state depression than the 
nonalcoholic group, as measured by the DEP scale of the SCL 
90 at the time of the memory task. 
Hypothesis 8. Alcoholic subjects will have 
significantly higher depressive bias scores than nonalcoholic 
subjects. This difference will be significantly attributable 
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to state depression (measured by the SCL 90 DEP scale) as a 
mediating variable. 
Hypothesis 9. Alcoholic subjects will be significantly 
higher than nonalcoholic subjects in overestimation of 
negative moods but will not be significantly different in 
overestimation of positive mood items. This difference will 
be significantly attributable to state depression (measured by 
the SCL 90 DEP scale) as a mediating variable. 
Strategic Processing Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 10. Alcoholic subjects will demonstrate 
significantly less strategic processing of items in the 
behavioral observations of their memory tasks than will 
nonalcoholic subjects. This difference will be significantly 
attributable to trait and state depression as mediating 
variables. 
Hypothesis 11. Across groups, the first sub-item 
judgement performed will be significantly different in 
accuracy than subsequent sub-item judgments. 
Hypothesis 12. When overestimation and underestimation 
are considered by order of sub-item judgment, the first 
sub-item judgment will demonstrate significantly less 
underestimation and significantly more overestimation than 
other sub-item judgments. 
Hypothesis 13. Nonalcoholic subjects will demonstrate 
significantly higher use of positive mood states as the first 
sub-items performed in behavioral observations of their 
memory tasks. This difference will be significantly 
attributable to trait and state depression as mediating 
variables. 
- 58 
Hypothesis 14. Alcoholic subjects will demonstrate 
strategic processing biases as stated in Hypothesis 13 to a 
significantly lesser degree, but in the same direction as 
nonalcoholic subjects. This difference will be significantly 
attributable to trait and state depression as mediating 
variables. 
CHAPTER IV 
METHOD 
The Preliminary Study 
The present study uses the self-report data and 
accuracy scores from the preliminary study described in the 
review of the relevant literature. These data are combined 
with archival data not used in the preliminary study 
consisting of behavioral observations of the memory task and 
psychological test data. Although reported elsewhere 
(Richards, 1986), the methods of the preliminary study will 
be described here in considerable detail. 
The preliminary investigation of memory for frequency 
of occurrences in alcoholics, was part of a larger, 
programmatic investigation of the recovery process begun in 
November 1983, at Parkside Lutheran Center for Substance 
Abuse in Park Ridge, Illinois. This center is a private 
hospital specializing in alcoholism treatment. The center 
was investigating patterns of recovery in alcoholics by use 
of intensive self-reports measures and structured interviews. 
The collection of much of the self-report data depended on 
subjects carrying long~range pagers, used to cue their 
completion of a standard self-report inventory. 
Clinical subjects for this larger investigation were 
59 
60 
volunteers recruited from the inpatient population who met 
two criteria: {a) geographic ease of access to the center for 
periodic interviews and exchanges of experimental materials, 
(b) the absence of any clinical judgment on the part of the 
treatment team that participation would be disruptive of the 
potential subject's adjustment after discharge, and (c) the 
absence of psychopathology so severe that it would preclude 
meaningful participation. Potential subjects excluded from 
recruitment due to the second criteria were extremely rare. 
Subjects were introduced to the experiment's purpose and 
methods in an information meeting, where the voluntary nature 
of their participation, confidentiality of subject 
information, and the independence of the study from the 
facility's treatment activities were emphasized. Participat-
ing subjects received a total of $50 for transportation 
and other expenses related to their participation. This 
involved two disbursements, one of $20 at discharge and 
a second of $30 at the investigator's receipt of all 
experimental materials at the completion of the 90-day 
participation. 
A community sample was recruited from the surrounding 
residential area to serve as a nonalcoholic comparison group. 
These subjects received $25 at the end of their two-week 
participation. An attempt was made to obtain a reasonably 
representative sample across the age, gender, and SES ranges 
typically served by the center. When subjects agreed to 
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participate, they were given several standard psychological 
tests, including the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory (MMPI). All subjects participated under a signed 
consent and all experimental procedures were reviewed and 
approved by the hospital's Human Subjects Committee, and were 
in accordance with the ethical guidelines of the American 
Psychological Association (APA). 
The clinical subjects were randomly assigned to one of 
three groups. Subjects in Group I carried the pager each day 
for the entire 90 days. Subjects in Group II followed the 
same protocol of filling out self-reports when paged, but 
carried pagers on a two weeks "on," two weeks "off" schedule. 
Subjects in Group III served as a clinical control group and 
did not carry a pager at any time. In addition to day-to-day 
self-reports, Groups I and II were assigned contact schedules 
for brief biweekly, on-site testing and interviews, 
alternating with biweekly telephone contacts conducted by 
trained, supervised research assistants. Group III was 
assigned only one telephone contact per month·and a final 
on-site interview with testing. 
For Groups I and II and the nonalcoholic group, a 
random sample of the subject's moods and experiences was 
obtained by means of long-range papers that were triggered 
randomly four times per day between the hours of 8:00 am. and 
10:00 p.m., seven days per week. Subjects who were scheduled 
to be "on the beeper" for a given period were to complete a 
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Daily Activity Report each time they were paged. This report 
is a self-report measure of mood states, thoughts, and 
experiences, based on the Experience Sampling Form (ESF), an 
inventory designed to be used to systematically sample 
experience by periodically cueing self-reports (Figure 1). 
The ESF includes items composed of adjectives describing mood 
state opposites on each pole of a Likert scale. Subjects 
indicated their mood state and its intensity by placing a 
mark somewhere along the continuum formed between the two 
mood extremes. 
At the end of two weeks of participation, subjects 
completed a series of self-report inventories including the 
Symptom Checklist 90 (SCL 90) (Derogatis, 1977). During the 
same session, subjects performed a memory task requiring 
estimates of the percent of occurrence of their previously 
recorded mood states. These estimates were collected by 
means of a paper and pencil instrument titled "Memory Task 
Moment-to-Moment Beep", which divided the above described 
bipolar adjective items into three categories of mood 
occurrence: the percent of one mood state, the percent where 
neither mood item applied, and the percent of the opposing 
mood state (Figure 2). For example, the Alert-Drowsy bipolar 
adjective item on the ESF is divided into three ranges: (a) 
very to somewhat alert; (b) neither alert nor drowsy; and (c) 
somewhat to very drowsy. Subjects were told to estimate the 
occurrence of their recorded moods in percentages, with 100% 
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Figure 1. Modified Exn~rience Sampling Form 
What were you thinking about?-------------------
Where were you? 
----------------------------What was the MAIN thing you were doing? 
--------------~ 
·Not at 
all 
Some-
what Quite Very 
How much choice did you have in 
selecting-this activity? +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
Did you feel in control of your 
activity? +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
How guilty did you feel? +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
How vulnerable did you feel? 
How self-conscious were you? 
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
How much were you concentrating? +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
How satisfied did you feel with 
yourself? +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
0 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 
Describe your mood as you were beeped: 
Very Quite Some Neither Some Quite Very 
Alert 0 0 0 0 Drowsy 
~appy 0 0 0 0 Sad 
Irritable 0 0 0 0 Cheerful 
Strong 0 0 0 0 Weak 
Angry 0 0 0 0 Friendly 
Active 0 0 0 0 Passive 
Lonely 0 0 0 0 Sociable 
Adequate 0 0 0 0 Inadequate 
Free 0 0 0 0 Constrafned 
Excited 0 0 0 0 Bored 
Proud 0 0 0 0 Ashamed 
Confused 0 0 0 0 Clear 
Tense 0 0 0 0 Relaxed 
Fat 0 0 0 0 Thin 
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Figure 2. Memory Task Moment-to-Moment Beep 
Check one: D Total Period D First 2 Weeks D Last 2 Weeks 
General Questions: 
1. What percentage of the time did you mark (fill out) your book 
on the EXTREME RIGHT of the mood rating form? __ % 
2. What percentage of the time did you mark (fill out) your book 
on the EXTREME LEFT of the mood rating form? __ % 
3. What percentage of the time did you mark the POSITIVE items on 
the mood rating form? __ % 
4. What percentage of the time did you mark the NEGATIVE items on 
the mood rating form? __ % 
Percentage of Responses 
Mood Questions 
very quite some neither some very quite 
0 0 0 0 
alert _% _% _% drowsy 
happy 
_% _% _% sad 
irritable 
_% _% _% cheerful 
strong 
_% _% _% weak 
angry 
_% _% _% friendly 
active 
_% _% _% passive 
lonely 
_% _% _% sociable 
proud 
_% _% _% ashamed 
confused 
_% _% _% clear 
tense 
_% _% _% relaxed 
Percentage (%) of Responses 
Not at all/Somewhat 
How preoccupied were you with eating? __ % 
How preoccupied were you with drinking/ 
using? __ % 
How confident did you feel about your 
ability to resist the urge to drink/ 
use? __ % 
Did you share your feelings with someone 
close to you? __ % 
Quite/Very 
_% 
_% 
_% 
_% 
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being the total number of times they responded to the bipolar 
adjective over the two week recording period. Graduate level 
research assistants administered the task according to · 
written directions designed to impress on the subject that 
memory was to be used to perform the task, rather than some 
other strategy, such as guessing what one might have recorded 
(See Appendix A). 
As subjects performed the above described memory task, 
the order in which they did the three sub-items tallying to 
100% for each bipolar mood item was observed by the research 
assistant, after the preliminary instructions that they were 
allowed to perform ~he sub-items in any order they chose. 
These observations were recorded by the experimenters, as 
unobtrusively as possible on a standard observation record 
(Figure 3). 
Accuracy measures were constructed by comparing each 
subjects estimates and recorded mood percentages in each 
category. A measure of relative accuracy, the discrimination 
coefficient, was formed by finding the correlation between 
estimates and actual mood occurrences. Difference scores 
were used to measure the amount and direction of error on 
each judgement. These accuracy measures resulted in the 
patterns of group differences described earlier in the review 
of the literature. Means and standard deviations by group of 
these variables are available in ~ppendix B (Tables B-1, B-2, 
B-3). 
Figure 3. Behavioral Observation Record. 
BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION OF 
MEMORY TEST 
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We want to observe and record the sequence of the answers 
to the mood and preoccupation/confident/feeling questions. 
As the subject fills out the form, observe how they 
complete these sections and record that information as 
follows: 
1 =FIRST CHOICE 2 = SECOND CHOICE 3 = THIRD CHOICE 
Columns 
One Two Three 
alert 
happy 
irritable 
strong 
angry 
active 
lonely 
proud 
confused 
tense 
Not at all/ somewhat = 1 
Quite/very = 2 
First Second 
Preoccupied eating 
Preoccupied drinking/using 
Confident 
Shared feelings 
The Present Study 
Subjects 
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All subjects were participants in the larger 
investigation of memory accuracy described above. Subjects 
consisted of 22 alcoholics and 22 nonalcoholics. Alcoholic 
subjects were selected at random from a larger pool of Group 
I and Group II subjects in the context study that had 
completed two weeks of participation and had taken the memory 
task. All nonalcoholic subjects that completed the two week 
participation period and the memory task were included in the 
present study. 
The alcoholic group consisted ~f 11 white males, 10 
white females, and 1 black male; whereas the nonalcoholic 
group consisted of 10 white males, 10 white females, 1 
oriental/white female, and 1 black male. The alcoholic group 
contained 19 persons whose level of education was at or above 
that of high school graduate, 2 persons who had below a high 
school education, and 1 person for whom this data was not 
available; whereas the nonalcoholic group consisted entirely 
of high school graduates. The alcoholic group's mean age was 
32.0 years with a standard deviation of 9.1 years, whereas 
the nonalcoholic group's mean age was 26.4 with a standard 
deviation of 7.8 years. 
Archival Data 
Archival data of several types were obtained for each 
of the 44 subjects. These data consisted of demographic 
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characteristics, records of mood over two weeks, memory 
accuracy scores, behavioral observations of the memory task 
and depression scores from the MMPI and SCL 90. Several of 
these sets of data have been described above under the 
description of the preliminary study. The ESF as a measure 
of mood, and not simply as a target stimuli for memory will 
be described below, along with relevant reliability and 
validity characteristics of the ESF, the MMPI Scale 2, and 
the SCL 90 DEP scale. 
The Experience Sampling Form: A Record of Mood Occurrences 
Mood state data for the present experiment were 
collected by means of the experience sampling method (ESM) 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1984). The method was developed 
to study the subjective experience of individuals interacting 
in natural environments, with an attempt to insure ecological 
validity. 
Long range pagers are used to cue subjects to complete 
self reports of thoughts, moods, activities and other aspects 
of experience. The pagers are activated, usually by radio, 
at random intervals during the day, resulting in the cue 
being unexpected by the subject. Studies using the ESM have 
inc1-uded studies of the phenomenology of everyday life 
(Klinger, 1978; Hurlburt, 1979); changes in self-esteem 
(Savin-Williams & Demo, 1983); variation in self-awareness 
(Franzoi & Brewer, 1984); frequency and intensity of moods 
(Diener & Larsen, 1984; Diener, Larsen, & Emmons, 1984) and 
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recovery process in alcoholics (Filstead, Reich, Parrella & 
Rossi, 1985). 
In addition to long distance pagers, the ESM utilizes 
standardized self-report forms, the Experience Sampling Form 
(ESF). The form is designed to take no more than 90 seconds 
to complete. Items include questions about the time when 
the form was completed, and the environmental circumstances, 
subject's thought content, and ongoing activities. In 
addition, the form contains a number of Likert scales 
measuring mood states, levels of arousal, and other 
self-perceptions. Item content may vary slightly depending 
on the area of interest of the researchers. For the present 
study, the original form was slightly modified, with 
additional questions about substance use, abstinence related 
activities, and preoccupation with using drugs or alcohol 
were added (See Figure 1). 
Although of the reliability of ESF data is a complex 
question, they are highly consistent across time within the 
same individual and within similar activities and situations, 
while differing significantly among various individuals, 
situations and activities. The.median correlation coefficient 
on the original eight Likert scale variables has been 
reported as .60 for adolescents and .74 for adults 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1984). For ESF data of German 
high school students across one week, Pawlik and Buse (1982) 
reported correlation coefficients of .57 for locations, .76 
70 
for moods, and .80 for motives. Individual consistency over 
two years for 28 adolescents was unexpectedly high, with 
test-retest correlations of individual items ranging from .45 
to .75 (Freedman, Csikszentmihalyi, & Larson, in press). 
The ESF has demonstrated high concurrent validity with 
physiological measures (such as heart rate and physical 
posture), activities (such as work versus play), and social 
contexts (such as being with friends versus being alone). 
For example, measures of affect and arousal decrease 
dramatically when subjects are alone, while measures of 
friendliness and sociability increase when at school for 
normal adolescents (Larson, 1979). Convergent validity of 
the ESF with a variety of other psychometric instruments have 
been demonstrated, including measures of alienation 
(Gianinno, Graef, & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983); work 
satisfaction (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1985); intimacy 
needs (McAdams & Constantian, 1983); intrinsic enjoyment 
(Hamilton, Haier, & Buchsbaum, 1984); and self-esteem (Well, 
1985). The ESF has shown strong predictive validity in 
distinguishing group membership based on item responses. 
Schizophrenics and non-schizophrenics (Csikszentmihalyi 
& Larson, 1984); bulemic women and normal women, (Larson & 
Johnson, 1985); light and heavy T.V. viewers (Kubey, 1984); 
and underachievers and achievers in high school performance 
(Robinson, 1985); have been demonstrated to have 
significantly different ESF profiles. In addition, ESF 
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reports have detected expected significant differences in 
ideographic studies of perception and experience before and 
after important life events, such as a suicide attempt 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1984); a marital separation 
(Wells, 1985); and personality alternations in a case of 
multiple personality (Hamilton et al., 1984). 
Depression Measures 
Several general issues are relevant to evaluating the 
appropriateness and validity of the specific measures of 
depression used in the present study. Screening for the 
presence of depression and depressive symptoms is often 
accomplished by means of self-rating scales. Cut-off scores 
on these scales are used to determine whether the diagnosis 
of depression is warranted in any given case. Instruments 
often used for this purpose include the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI) (Beck, 1967); the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory, Scale 2 for depression (MMPI-D) 
(Hathaway & McKinley, 1951); the Hamilton Depression Scale 
(Ham-D); the Raskin Depression Scale (Raskin et al., 1969) 
the Mood Assessment Scale (MAS) (Yesavge et al., 1983); the 
Self-Rating Depression Scale (SDS) (Zung, 1965), and the 
Symptom Checklist 90 (SCL 90) (Derogatis, 1977). 
Correlations among these self-rating scales tend to be 
moderate (.60 to .93) (Willenbring, 1986). The wide range of 
estimates for the occurrence of depression in alcoholics (3% 
to 98%) has been interpreted as in part related to the lack 
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of agreement among the various scales used for the purpose of 
diagnosis (Weissman & Meyers, 1980). Willenbring (1986) 
argues that, ideally, these instruments should be both 
sensitive to true positive cases and result in few false 
positives when depression as determined by the current 
diagnostic system (DSM-III) is used as a criterion. Yet this 
is currently not the case (Hesselbrock, Hesselbrock, Tennen, 
Meyer, & Workman, 1983). 
Instruments differ from each other and from the DSM-III 
in the way in which depression is conceptualized. For 
example, in a study of the factor structure of the BDI and 
the SDS, Gibson and Becker (1973) found that although the 
factors present in alcoholics were for the most part similar 
to those in depressed patients, an additional factor that 
they labelled endogenous depression did not occur to the same 
extent in the data for the alcoholics, suggesting that the 
alcoholics might exhibit the cognitive disturbance associated 
with depression, without having a true endogenous depression. 
Since the DSM-III criteria rely heavily on endogenous-type 
symptoms to determine the diagnosis of depression, any 
self-report inventory that measures depressive factors other 
than the endogenous factor may have a low correlation with 
criterion, yet nonetheless, reflect a kind of depression. 
The measures of depression and affect used in the 
pres~nt study consisted of one trait depression measure, the 
MMPI, and one state depression measures, the SCL 90, and one 
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measure of general affect over time, the Daily Activity 
Report form of the ESF. The appropriateness, validity, and 
reliability of each of these measures will be reviewed .. 
The MMPI Scale 2 as a Measure of Trait Depression. The 
MMPI is commonly used as a measure of depression in studies 
of depression in alcoholics (Dinning & Evan, 1977; Query and 
Megran, 1984; Willenbing, 1986). The MMPI is an instrument 
with an extensive literature, most of which reflects its 
sound convergent and discriminant validity as a measure of 
personality traits and symptom patterns (Wiggins, 1966, 1969; 
Wiggins, Goldberg, & Applebaum, 1971). Although at times 
used to measure short term symptom patterns, the MMPI was 
designed and is most typically used to measure enduring 
personality traits (such as trait depression) and 
longstanding symptom patterns. 
Although the MMPI-D was not originally designed to be 
used alone to discriminate depress~ves from nondepressives, 
elevation of the D scale (T-score = 70, over two standard 
deviations above the mean) is often used alone or in 
combination with other elevations as an indication of 
depressive symptoms (Nerviano et al., 1980, 1981). D scale 
(Scale 2) contains items reflecting a broad range of 
depressive symptoms, including dysphoric mood and affect, 
withdrawal, apathy, somatic concerns, ahedonia, lack of 
motivation, feelings of hopelessness, suicidal ideation and 
other cognitive expression of depression. 
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Based on the criterion of MMPI-D T score greater than 
70 indicating depression, estimates of the percent of 
alcoholics categorized as depressed range from 43% 
(Hesselbrock et al., 1883) to 62% (Zeeler et al., 1979). In 
one study comparing the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and 
the MMPI-D in their ability to accurately predict alcoholics 
diagnosed as also having depression as conceptualized in the 
DSM-III and as determined by the National Institute of Mental 
Health Diagnostic Interview Schedule (NIMH-DIS), neither 
instrument agreed well with the DSM-III, but were moderately 
correlated with each other (£ =.59) (Hesselbrock et al., 
1983). The investigators interpreted the finding of only a 
moderate correlation between the MMPI-D and the BDI as due to 
differences in time frames, symptom-clustering criteria, 
formats, and modes of administration between the two 
instruments. Willenbring (1986) found that the agreement 
among the MMPI-D, BDI and Ham-D was not high (r = .4), 
suggesting to him that they measure related but distinct 
phenomena, and cited evidence that the BDI is more sensitive 
to state symptoms rather than enduring personality patterns. 
State Measures of Depression: the Symptom Checklist 
90. The Symptom Checklist 90 (SCL 90; Derogatis, 1977) is a 
multidimentional self-report inventory comprised of 90 items, 
each rated on a five-point dimension of distress (0 to 4) 
from "not at all" to "extremely". The instrument consists of 
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items comprising nine symptom dimensions and seven items that 
do not load on any symptom dimension. The symptom 
dimensions are Somatization (SOM), Obsessive-Compulsive· 
(O-C), Interpersonal Sensitivity (INT), Depression (DEP), 
Anxiety (ANX), Hostility (HOS), Phobic Anxiety (PHOB), 
Paranoid Ideation (PAR), and Psychoticism (PSY). Items in 
each dimension have face validity with these titles. From 
responses to these dimensions and the seven additional items, 
three global indices of pathology are calculated. The global 
indices are the Global Severity Index (GSI), the Positive 
Symptom Distress Index (PSDI) and the Positive Symptom Total 
(PST). 
The GSI is considered by the test author to be the best 
single indicator of the current level of pathological 
symptoms, and is the grand total of the summed distress 
scores for the 9 symptom dimensions and additional items. 
The PST reflects the range of problems identified by the 
subject, and is the count of non-zero responses to the 90 
items. The PSDI is a measure of average intensity of 
distress, and is the mean level of non-zero responses. The 
discriminant and convergent validity of the SCL 90 has been 
investigated with both outpatient subjects and inpatient 
subjects (Dinning & Evans, 1977). The nine symptom 
dimensions have been shown to have peak correlations (r ~ 4) 
with analogous MMPI scales while correlating to a lesser 
degree (£ < .4) with nonanalogous scales (Derogatis et al., 
1976). 
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The SCL 90 was developed for use with an outpatient 
medical and psychiatric population, and its use with 
inpatient populations has been questioned (Steer & Henry, 
1979) as has the use of many popular self-report measures of 
depression with non-clinical samples (Tanka-Matsumi & 
Kameoka, 1986). Nonetheless, the SCL 90 is sometimes used 
for measuring depression and other kinds of distress in 
alcoholics and prototypical symptom profiles for alcoholics 
have been developed, with alcoholics typically having profile 
peaks on DEP as well as the Anxiety and Phobia dimensions and 
lowest symptom scores on Hostility (Derogatis, 1977). This 
may be compared to profiles for depressed patients from the 
same source, who tended to have peaks on 
Obsessive-Compulsive, Depression, and Anxiety with the lowest 
score tending to be on Hostility. 
Several studies have investigated the factor structure 
of the SCL 90 (Cyr, 1979; Derogatis & Cleary, 1977; Evanson, 
Holland, Metha, & Yasif, 1980; Hoffman & Overall, 1978; 
Holcomb, Adams, & Ponder, 1983) with various results, leading 
several investigators to conclude that the SCL 90 might best 
be seen as a general measure of distress, rather than 
possessing the ability to measure types of distress as 
suggested by its various dimensions. Despite these 
reservations, for the purposes of the present study, it is 
important to note that all factor analytic studies of the SCL 
90 have found at least one viable Depression factor, and two 
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studies (Hoffman & Overall, 1978 ; Holcomb et al., 1983) 
found an Insomnia factor that was highly correlated with the 
Depression factor. 
The DEP dimension is used as a measure of depression in 
the current study and is therefore of special interest. It 
consists of 12 items appearing in Table 1. 
In an inpatient population, one study (Dinning & 
Evans, 1977) found the correlation between BDI and SCL 90 DEP 
to be high (£ = .7) and its correlation with the MMPI-D to be 
moderate (£ = .4). The same study also found significant 
correlations of the SCL 90 dimensions and the L and K scales 
of the MMPI, indicating that defensiveness and dissimulation 
result in lower scores on the SCL 90 scales while "fake bad" 
response sets result in higher scores for distress on the SCL 
90. 
In a study more relevant to alcoholic patients, 
Rounsaville, Weissman, Rosenberger, Wilber and Kleber (1979) 
examined the specificity and sensitivity of five depression 
screening scales in young drug abusers. The SCL 90 was found 
to have a 94% true positive rate for current depression, as 
determined by the Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC) (Spitzer 
and Endicott, 1978)i with most false positive occurring in 
persons with a history of depression. 
In summary, despite a lack of agreement of how specific 
measures should best be used to measure _depression, there is 
sufficient evidence that the trait measure (the MMPI Scale 2) 
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Table 1 
·rtems of the SCL 90 Depression Dimension 
No. Symptom Item 
5 Loss of sexual interest or pleasure 
14 Feeling low in energy or slowed down 
15 Thoughts of ending your life 
20 Crying easily 
22 Feeling of being trapped or caught 
26 Blaming yourself for things 
29. Feeling lonely 
30 Feeling blue 
31 Worrying too much about things 
54 Feeling hopeless about the future 
71 Feeling everything is an effort 
79 Feelings of worthlessness 
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and state measure (the SCL 90) to be used in the present 
study have considerable reliability and validity as measures 
of depression. Also, the ESF both measures mood states· over 
time with demonstrated sound reliability and validity. 
Procedure 
Several measures of accuracy and bias were constructed 
for the purposes of the present study from archival absolute 
difference and signed difference scores. For each subject 
composite scores for memory accuracy on positive items and 
memory accuracy on negative items were constructed by 
calculating the mean absolute error for items of each type. 
Four scores reflecting bias were calculated by finding the 
total overestimation and total underestimation for each mood 
type, positive and negative. From these four scores two 
measures of hypothesized cognitive biases were constructed. 
Depression bias scores were constructed by summing the 
overestimation of negative moods and the underestimation of 
positive moods. Self-protective bias scores were formed by 
summing the overestimation of positive moods and the 
underestimation of negative moods. 
The recorded behavioral observations of the memory task 
were used to develop several measures reflecting strategic 
processing. The total number of sub-items performed in the 
identical order as they appeared on the memory task form was 
used as a measure of degree of strategic processing, with 
lower scores indicating more strategic processing. The 
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number of items in which the first performed sub-item was the 
last presented sub-item on the memory task form was also used 
as a measure of increased strategic processing. Two me~sures 
of the direction of strategic processing were calculated: the 
number of times that a subject performed negative sub-items 
when a positive sub-item was presented, and similarly, the 
number of times that positive sub-items were performed 
initially after a negative sub-item was presented on the 
memory form. 
MMPI Scale 2 T scores were extracted from the archive 
for each subject, as were SCL 90 DEP Scale mean intensity 
scores, demographic data, and ESF records. Analyses were 
performed to demonstrated hypothesized group differences on 
relevant variables, and to demonstrate the relationship of 
those differences to depression. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Preliminary Analyses 
Demographic Data 
Group differences in educational level, gender and race 
were examined by means of the chi-square statistic, resulting 
in no significant differences between groups on any of these 
demographic variables. When age differences were examined, 
however, alcoholic subjects were found to be significantly 
older than nonalcoholic subjects. The mean age in the 
alcoholic group was 32.0 with a standard deviation of 9.1 
years~ whereas the nonalcoholic group mean age was 26.5 with 
a standard deviation of 7.8 years, t(42) = 2.15, E < .04. 
These variables are summarized in Table 2. 
To assess the strength of relationship of age with 
variables of interest other than group status, the correlation 
coefficients between age and other variables (i.e. demographic 
variables, measures of memory accuracy and bias, and measures 
of depression) were calculated. No significant cor1 :ations 
were obtained. Despite this evidence of only a weak relation-
ship of age with other variables of interest, age was used as 
a covariate in subsequent analyses of group differences, 
because of the possibility of significant interactions. 
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Table 2 
Demographic Data by Group. 
variable Group 
Alcoholic Nonalcoholic 
(N = 22) (N = 22) 
Mean Age 32.0 (9.1) 26. 4 ( 7. 8) * 
Gender 
Males 11 11 
Females 11 11 
Race 
White 21 20 
Other 1 2 
Education 
High School or Higher 19 22 
Less than High School 2 0 
Information not available 1 0 
·-~· * .E ~ 05 
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Memory Bias and Memory Accuracy Scores 
Memory estimates and recorded mood occurrences were 
compared to produce several measures of memory accuracy· and 
memory bias. Three measures of memory accuracy were of 
interest: discrimination coefficients, absolute error on 
positive mood items, and absolute error on negative mood 
items. Discrimination coefficients for overall relative 
accuracy were found by computing the correlation of memory 
estimates to corresponding mood occurrences across each 
subject's memory task form. Mood items were divided into two 
types: positive moods and negative moods. The positive mood 
items were Alert, Happy, Strong, Actiye, Proud, Cheerful, 
Friendly, Sociable, Clear, and Relaxed. The negative mood 
items were Angry, Irritable, Lonely, Confused, Tense, Drowsy, 
Sad, Weak, Passive, and Ashamed. The two absolute accuracy 
measures were calculated by summing absolute differences 
between memory estimates and mood occurrences across items 
for each mood content type. 
Measures of memory bias were calculated from signed 
differences between each subject's memory estimates and 
corresponding mood occurrences. Two overestimate variables 
were formed by calculating the mean of negative signed 
differences for each mood item type. Two underestimate 
variables were similarly calculated from differences with 
positive signs. A measure of depression bias was formed by 
summing overestimation of negative items and underestimation 
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of positive items. A measure of self-protective bias was 
formed by summing underestimation of negative items and 
overestimation of positive items. 
The measures of memory accuracy and bias described here 
were used as the dependent measures for testing specific 
hypotheses about the relationship of depression to cognitive 
differences between alcoholics and nonalcoholics. State 
depression and trait depression were expected to have 
different effects on each memory measure. The means and 
standard deviations of these measures of accuracy and bias 
are reported by group in Table 3, along with. the same 
information for the measures of depression to be discussed 
below. 
Measures of Trait and State Depression 
The MMPI Scale 2 T-score was obtained for each subject, 
as was the mean intensity score on the DEP Scale of the SCL 
90. The means, standard deviations, and significant 
differences as determined by t-tests for these two variables 
is reported in Table 3. Alcoholic subjects had significantly 
higher trait depression scores, t(42) = 2.30, E ~ .03. The 
alcoholic group also had higher state depression, although 
the difference between group means was not significant. When 
the cut-off of MMPI Scale 2 T-score greater than or equal to 
70 was used to categorize subjects as trait depressed, no 
nonalcoholic group subjects were categorized as clinically 
depressed, whereas 8 alcoholic subjects (5 females and 3 
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Table 3 
Measures of Accuracy, Bias, and Depression 
Measure Group 
Alcoholic Nonalcoholic 
(N = 2 2) (N = 2 2) 
M SD M SD 
Depression Measures 
MMPI Scale 2 63.7 (16.3) 54.2 ( 11.0) * 
SCL 90 DEP .850 (.686) • 6 25 (.631) 
Accuracy Measures 
Absolute Error: Positives 15.7 ( 5.6) 16.8 ( 13.5) 
Absolute Error: Negatives 11. 5 ( 6.2) 8.3 ( 3.9) * 
Discrimination Coefficient .80 ( • 1 8 ) .83 ( . 15) 
Bias Measures 
Self-Protective Bias 14.5 8. 7) 15.9 9.4) 
Underestimation: Negatives 7.0 4.9) 5.9 ( 3.7) 
Overestimation: Positives 7.5 5.5) 10.0 (11.1) 
Depression Bias 11. 0 8. 7) 6.8 5.7) 
Overestimation: Negatives 4.7 ( 5.2) 2.3 ( 2. 8) 
Underestimation: Positives 6.5 6.0) 4.3 • 9) 
~· MMPI Scale 2 units are T-scores. DEP scale units are 
mean intensity scores. All other non-correlational variables 
are measured in percent in error. 
~- * .l2 ~ .05. 
86 
males) were so categorized. When the same T-score on the SCL 
90 DEP scale was used to categorize persons as state 
depressed using the norms for psychiatric outpatients, no 
subject's score reached criterion. When the nonpatient norms 
were used, 3 nonalcoholic subjects (1 male and 2 females) and 
3 alcoholic subjects (1 male and 2 females) were categorized 
as state depressed. Only one subject had clinical levels of 
depression on both state and trait measures, a 27 year old 
white female, who also had the highest frequency of negative 
affect among all subjects (55.14%) and the second highest 
discrimination coefficient (.95 compared to the highest of 
.96). 
Correlational analyses were conducted to investigate 
the assumption that these measures of state and trait 
depression were significantly related to measures of memory 
accuracy and bias. The results of these analyses are 
summarized in Table 4. Both trait and state depression had 
significant correlations at the .05 level with several 
measures of accuracy and bias. For trait depression 
significant correlations occurred on absolute error on 
negative items (£ = -.367), absolute error on positive items 
(r = .406), overestimation of negative moods (£ = .446), 
depressive bias scores (r =· .347), and with state depression 
(r = .351). The latter correlation between the two measures 
of depression is similar to that found in other studies (for 
example, Dinning and Evans, 1977 reported the correlation to 
Table 4 
Trait and State Depression Correlations Across Groups 
Measure 
Depression Measures 
MMPI Scale 2 
Frequency of Negative Affect 
Accuracy Measures 
Absolute Error: Positives 
Absolute Error: Negatives 
Bias Measures 
Self-Protective Bias 
Underestimation: Negatives 
Overestimation: Positives 
Depression Bias 
Overestimation: Negatives 
Underestimation: Positives 
Behavioral Indices 
Performed as Presented 
Shift from Positive Pole 
Shift from Negative Pole 
~- *.E. < .05. 
Trait 
1. 000 
. 217 
-.116 
.406 * 
-.091 
.015 
-.124 
.347 * 
.446 * 
.142 
.189 
- .126 
-.025 
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State 
.351 * 
.582 * 
-.148 
.290 
-.244 
-.032 
-.296 * 
.339 * 
.347 * 
.211 
.285 
-.189 
-.217 
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be .4). For state depression significant correlations were 
with overestimation of positive items (£ = -.296), over-
estimation of negative items (£ = .347), frequency of negative 
affect over two weeks (r = .582), and depression bias (r = 
.339). The correlation of state depression with absolute 
error on negative items approached significance (£ = .290, 
critical value of alpha at .05, two-tailed= .292). 
Specific Hypotheses 
Three sets of hypotheses were tested: hypotheses about 
the relationship between trait depression and affective 
memory differences between alcoholics and nonalcoholics; 
hypotheses about the relationship of state depression to 
these differences; and hypotheses relating both kinds of 
depression to the behavioral observations of subjects 
performing the memory task. Each hypothesis predicted a 
difference between alcoholics and nonalcoholics on a specific 
memory production or a behavioral index related to the memory 
task. 
The data analytic approach used, unless otherwise 
noted, was to first demonstrate the hypothesized group 
differences by means of~ tests or ANOVA's. This was 
followed by an ANCOVA analysis to test the significance of 
trait depression and state depression as covariates. Each 
form of depression was predicted to act as a mediator of 
specific memory differences, with one type of depression 
having a significant effect while the other type of depession 
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would not. Despite the prediction of different effects for 
the two depression variables, trait depression and state 
depression were expected to be moderately correlated. 
Therefore, both depression measures were used as covariates 
in ANCOVA's in order to evaluate the unique influence of each 
type of depression on the dependent variables. This strategy 
addressed an alternative explanation that might be given for 
any significant mediation by one form of depression: that the 
other form of depression may also, and perhaps better, 
account for the observed effect. Age was also included as a 
covariate in the ANCOVA's to control for the significant 
group difference in age. (In no case was age a significant 
covariate in these analyses; age is therefore not discussed 
further in the discussion of individual hypotheses.) 
Finally, correlational analyses were conducted to investigate 
the direction and strength of the relationship of each type 
of depression to the dependent measures. 
Trait Depression Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1. The alcoholic group will have a 
significantly higher level of depression than the non-
alcoholic group, as measured by Scale 2 of the MMPI. 
When a t-test between groups on MMPI Scale 2 scores was 
conducted, the groups differed significantly in the predicted 
direction, t(42) = 2.30, £ < .025, one-tailed. When age was 
entered as a covariate in an analysis of variance, the 
resulting statistic for the effect of the covariate was not 
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significant. The statistic for the main effect for groups 
was significant, F(l, 42) = 5.97, £ < .02. The hypothesis 
was supported. 
Hypothesis 2. Alcoholic subjects will have significant-
ly lover self-protective bias scores than nonalcoholic sub-
jects. This difference will be significantly attributable to 
trait depression (measured by Scale 2 MMPI) as a mediating 
variable. 
Statistics resulting from an ANOVA between groups on 
self-protective bias scores and from an ANOVA on self-
protective bias scores with age as a covariate were not 
significant with alpha set at .05. Subsequent analyses 
controlling for one or both kinds of depression also resulted 
in non-significant F-ratios. The hypothesis was not 
supported. 
Hypothesis 3. Alcoholic subjects will have significant-
ly lover absolute accuracy of memory than nonalcoholics after 
depression has been controlled. 
This hypothesis assumes that trait depression related 
biases may obscure differences in cognitive efficiency 
between alcoholics and nonalcoholics. Two measures of 
absolute accuracy were used: one for positive mood items and 
one for negative mood items. The difference between groups 
on absolute accuracy for positive items was not significant. 
Neither age, trait depression, nor state depression had 
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significant F-ratios as covariates. However, trait 
depression was found to be significantly correlated at the 
.05 level with absolute error on positive items <.r. = .446). 
The ANOVA between groups on absolute accuracy on 
negative items produced a significant main effect for groups 
F(l,42) =6.233, £ < .02. Analyses of underestimation and 
overestimation of negative moods described under state 
depression hypothesis 9 below clarify the source of this 
significant group difference as being due primarily to 
overestimation of negative moods. When an ANOVA was 
performed controlling for the effects of age, trait 
depression and state depression before calculating the group 
effect, the main effect for group was no longer significant 
F(l, 40) = 1.466, £ < .3. Trait depression was the only 
significant covariate, F(l, 42) = 5.275, £ < .03. Trait 
depression correlated significantly at the .05 level with 
absolute error on negative items (£ = -.367), as did the 
occurrence of negative affect over two weeks (£ = .555). 
The hypothesis of group differences in accuracy after 
the statistical control of depression was not supported for 
either positive or negative mood items. In fact, the 
opposite effect was observed. Lower accuracy in alcoholics 
was found to be significantly attributable to trait 
depression differences between groups. Across groups, trait 
depression was found to be significantly correlated with 
decreases in accuracy on positive mood items and increases in 
accuracy on negative mood items. 
- 92 
Hypothesis 4. Alcoholic subjects will have 
significantly higher rates of negative affective states on 
ESF records than nonalcoholic subjects. This difference will 
be significantly attributable to trait depression {measured 
by Scale 2 MMPI) as a mediating variable. 
The mean frequency of negative moods was calculated 
for each subject. The alcoholic group mean was 23.29% with a 
standard deviation of 13.5%, whereas the nonalcoholic group 
mean was 16.84% with a standard deviation of 8.2%. When an 
ANOVA was performed calculating the sums of squares for the 
grouping variable before the covariate effects were removed, 
the statistic for the main effect for groups closely 
approached significance, F{l, 42) = 4.04, E ~ .052. The 
difference between groups was significant and in the 
predicted direction when tested by means of t-tests, t(42) = 
1.92, E < .04, one-tailed. Of three covariates entered in 
the ANOVA analysis (age, state depression, and trait 
depression) only trait depression significantly explained 
variahce in frequency of negative mood occurrence, F(l, 39) = 
4.92, E c~ .04. When an ANOVA was performed removing the 
effects of age, state depression, and trait depression before 
calculating the sum of squares for group effects, the group 
effect statistic was highly significant, F = 7 .519, E < .01. 
Contrary to the prediction of this hypothesis, the control of 
trait depression increased between group variance in the 
frequency of occurrence of negative mood states. 
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Hypothesis 5. Alcoholic subjects vill have 
significantly lower variation in moods on ESF records than 
nonalcoholic subjects. This difference vill be significantly 
attributable to trait depression (measured by Scale 2 MMPI) 
as a mediating variable. 
The variance of mood item response over two weeks was 
calculated for each subject. The alcoholic group had a mean 
variance of 243.69 with a standard deviation of 625.8, 
whereas the nonalcoholic group had a mean variance of 918.59 
with a standard deviation of 1626.5; the difference between 
groups was significant under the one tailed test provided for 
in the hypothesis, t(42) = 1.82, E < .05, one-tailed. The F 
statistic reflected the same level of group effect, F(l,42) = 
3.121, E < .09. The model no longer demonstrated a trend 
toward significance when age, state depression and trait 
depression were statistically controlled, F(l, 39) = .962, E 
< .66, NS. However, none of the covariates were significant, 
including that of trait depression. The hypothesis that 
lower variation in ESF mood records is significantly 
attributable to trait depression was not supported. 
Hypothesis 6. Alcoholic subjects vill demonstrate 
significantly less sensitivity in their estimates to extremes 
of ESF mood-state occurrence than vill nonalcoholic subjects. 
This difference will be significantly attributable to trait 
depression (measured by Scale 2 MMPI) as a mediating 
variable. 
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The percent of extreme responses to items on the 
self-report scale was calculated for each subject. All 
subject self-ratings that utilized the ''Very" intensity· 
marker for any mood state were considered extreme. Due to 
the arrangement of the bipolar scales, the percent of extreme 
responses corresponded to the percent of responses using 
either the far right-hand or far left-hand Likert scale 
marker. 
The alcoholic group had a mean percent of extremes of 
7.54 with a standard deviation of 9.02, whereas the 
nonalcoholic group had a mean of 6.84 with a standard 
deviation of 10.6. The difference between groups was not 
significant. Discrimination scores described earlier were 
used as the measure of accuracy. The alcoholic group had a 
mean relative accuracy of .80 with a standard deviation of 
.18, whereas the nonalcoholic group had a standard deviation 
of .83 with a standard deviation of .15. Analyses were 
conducted using the ~ transformations of these scores. The 
difference between groups was not significant. The 
correlation of extreme responses with accuracy was .2786 
across groups (£ = .067). For the alcoholic subjects alone, 
this correlation was .2278, whereas for the nonalcoholic 
group alone the correlation was .3405. Although these group 
correlations were in the direction hypothesized, neither the 
correlations for individual groups nor the difference between 
these correlations approached significance, perhaps due to 
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the limit in sample size. The hypothesized significant group 
differences were not supported, therefore the further 
hypothesized relationship of such differences to depression 
were not analyzed. 
To summarize the findings on trait depression 
hypotheses: as predicted alcoholics were more depressed than 
nonalcoholics. They did not, however, have significantly 
lower self-protective bias scores. Alcoholics and 
nonalcoholic subjects were not significantly different on 
absolute accuracy on positive items, with or without 
covariates in the analyses. For absolute accuracy on 
negative mood items, alcoholics demonstrated more error, due 
to overestimation of negative moods. Contrary to prediction, 
however, this difference between groups was found to be 
attributable to trait depression. As predicted, alcoholics 
were found to have significantly higher negative affect on 
ESF records and significantly less variability in their ESF 
records. Contrary to prediction, group differences in ESF 
negative affect were found to be suppressed by trait 
depression. ESF record variability differences were not 
found to be significantly attributable to trait depression. 
Finally, alcoholic subjects had lower correlations between 
percent of extreme scores and relative accuracy, although not 
significantly lower than nonalcoholic subjects. 
State Depression Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses predict bias related to state 
depression, and assume state dependent memory effects. 
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Hypothesis 7. The alcoholic group vill have a 
significantly higher level of state depression than the 
nonalcoholic group, as measured by the DEP scale of the -SCL 
90 at the time of the memory task. 
The alcoholic group had a mean DEP scale score of .850, 
with a standard deviation of .686, whereas the nonalcoholic 
group had a mean of .625, with a standard deviation of .631. 
Although the means were in the predicted directions, the 
differences between groups on SCL 90 DEP scale scores did not 
approach significance, and the hypothesis was not supported. 
Hypothesis 8. Alcoholic subjects vill have 
significantly higher depressive bias scores than nonalcoholic 
subjects. This difference vill be significantly attributable 
to state depression (measured by the SCL 90 DEP scale) as a 
mediating variable. 
The one-tailed test specified in the hypothesis was 
significant at the .05 level, t(42) = 2.32, £ < .04, with 
alcoholics having the higher depressive bias scores. When an 
ANOVA was performed with age, trait depression, and state 
depression as covariates, state depression was not a 
significant covariate. As stated earlier, the combined 
subjects correlation of state depression and depressive bias 
was found to be significant, and in the expected direction (£ 
= .339), but smaller than that with trait depression (r 
=.347). The hypothesis of greater depressive bias in 
alcoholics was supported. However, this difference was not 
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significantly attributable to state depression. The second 
half of this hypothesis was not supported. 
Hypothesis 9. Alcoholic subjects will be significantly 
higher than nonalcoholic subjects in overestimation of 
negative moods but will not be significantly different in 
overestimation of positive mood items. This difference will 
be significantly attributable to state depression (measured 
by the SCL 90 DEP scale) as a mediating variable. 
Comparisons by means of t-tests resulted in no 
significant differences between groups in overestimation of 
positive moods. ANOVA's controlling for depression and age 
resulted in no significant differences between groups on 
overestimation of positive items. 
Overestimation of negative moods was not significantly 
different when tested by means of t-tests. However, when an 
ANOVA was performed on negative mood overestimation computing 
the sum of squares for the grouping variable before 
controlling for age, trait depression, and state depression, 
the main effect for groups was significance given the 
one-tailed hypothesis under consideration, F(l, 40) = 2.991, 
£ < .09. Among the covariates, only trait depression was 
significantly related to the overestimation of negative 
moods, F(l,41) = 7.03, E < .02. Contrary to prediction, 
state depression was not a significant covariate. An ANOVA 
on the same variable, but calculating the sum of squares for 
the grouping factor after the computation of covariate 
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effects, resulted in a much lower F value for groups, F(l,42) 
= .725, £ = .40, NS. The hypothesized group difference in 
overestimation of negative moods was supported. This differ-
ence, however, was attributable to trait depression and not 
to state depression as had been hypothesized. 
To summarize the findings on state depression 
hypotheses: alcoholics did not have significantly higher 
levels of state depression than nonalcoholic subjects. 
Alcoholics had significantly higher depressive bias scores, 
but this difference was not significantly attributable to 
state depression and was more related to trait than state 
depression. The groups were not significantly different in 
overestimates of positive items. Although the groups were 
significantly different in overestimation of negative items; 
the difference was significantly explained by trait depres-
sion and not by state depression as predicted. 
Strategic Processing Hypotheses 
This set of hypotheses assumed that order of sub-item 
performance on the memory task was a behavioral index of the 
degree and type of cognitive strategy used by the subjects. 
Hypothesis 10. Alcoholic subjects vill demonstrate 
significantly less strategic processing of items in the 
behavioral observations of their memory tasks than will non-
alcoholic subjects. This difference will be significantly 
attributable to trait and state depression as mediating 
variables. 
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Two variables were used to assess this hypothesis: the 
number of items performed in the identical sub-item order 
presented on the memory task form, and the total number Of 
items where the sub-item presented last on the memory task 
form was performed first. Descriptive statistics and 
significant differences between groups for these variables 
and other behavioral indeces of strategic processing appear 
in Table 5. On the number of items performed as presented, 
the alcoholic group had a mean of 5.41 and a standard 
deviation of 3.12, whereas the nonalcoholic group had a mean 
of 3.45 and a standard deviation of 1.97. The difference 
between groups was significant, t(42) = 2.42, £ < .001, 
one-tailed. An ANOVA on identically performed items with 
age, state and trait depression as covariates indicated that 
no covariates were significantly related to this variable. 
The number of identically performed items was 
significantly correlated at the .05 level with absolute 
error on positive items (r = -.438), overestimation of 
positive items (£ = .475), and self-protective bias (£ = 
-.347). Although neither correlation was significant, the 
correlation of this variable with trait depression was lower 
than its correlation with state depression (r = -.189 
compared to£= -.285). 
On the number of items where the presented pole was 
substituted for the opposite· pole, the alcoholic group had a 
mean of .818 and a standard deviation of 1.26, whereas the 
Table 5 
Behavioral Indices of Strategic Processing 
Behavioral Index 
Alcoholic 
(N = 22) 
M SD 
Performed as Presented 5.4 ( 3. 2) 
Performed with Poles Switched .8 ( 1. 3) 
Shift from Positive Pole . 3 ( . 5) 
Shift from Negative Pole .5 ( 1. 0) 
Note. Units are number of bipolar items. 
Note. *E < .005. 
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Group 
Nonalcoholic 
(N = 2 2) 
M SD 
3.5 (2.0) * 
2.2 ( 1. 7) * 
1. 2 ( 1. 1 ) * 
1. 1 ( 1. 2) 
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nonalcoholic group had a mean of 2.227, and a standard 
deviation of 1.72, a difference that was also significant in 
the predicted direction, ~(42) = 3.11, E < .002, one-tailed. 
An ANOVA on the number of items with switched first and 
third presented sub-items indicated a trend of trait 
depression to significantly explain the variance, F(l,40) = 
3.968, E < .06. The F value of variance due to groups was 
smaller when the covariates were computed before the group 
effects, F(l,42) = 11.750, E < .002 compared with F(l, 39) = 
12.733, E < .002. The hypothesized group differences in 
strategic processing were supported. While there was weak 
evidence that depression was related to strategic processing, 
the group differences in strategic processing could not be 
attributed entirely to depression. 
Hypothesis 11. Across groups, the first sub-item 
judgment performed will be significantly different in 
accuracy than subsequent sub-item judgments. 
The sums of absolute error of estimates across items 
for first sub-item performed, second sub-item performed and 
third sub-item performed were calculated. Means and standard 
deviations of these variables and other measures of accuracy 
and bias by order of sub-item performance appear in Table 6. 
No significant group differences occurred on these variables, 
although the means were in the predicted direction. 
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed across groups 
on absolute accuracy by order of sub-item performance. The 
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Table 6 
Accuracy and Bias by Order of Sub-item Performance 
Measure by Performance Order 
First 
Second 
Third 
Underestimation 
First 
Second 
Third 
Group 
Alcoholic 
(N = 22) 
M SD 
85.3 (58.2) 
54.4 (42.9) 
58.3 (42.1) 
57.4 (42.9) 
70.0 (35.4) 
58.3 (33.4) 
Nonalcoholic 
(N = 2 2) 
M SD 
82.2 (52.2) 
47 .4 (31.4) 
75.0 (66.7) 
49.3 (31.4) 
96. 1 ( 64. 7) 
51.0 (33.4) 
Note. All units of measure are percent in error. 
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effect for the repeated measure did not approach signif-
icance. However, the univariate F test comparing the 
third choice with the other two choices approached signi-
ficance, F(l,43) = 3.442, £ < .08. Subsequent t-tests 
indicated a trend toward the first choice being significantly 
more inaccurate than the third choice, t(43) = 1.79, £ < 
.09. The hypothesis as stated was not supported. However, 
trends were found for differences in accuracy by order of 
performance. 
Hypothesis 12. When overestimation and underestimation 
are considered by order of sub-item judgment, the first 
sub-item judgment will demonstrate significantly less under-
estimation and significantly more overestimation than other 
sub-item judgments. 
Overestimation and underestimation sums by order of 
sub-item performance were calculated for each subject. The 
resulting means and standard deviations by group appear in 
Table 6. No significant group differences occurred on these 
variables. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on 
overestimation by performance order by group was conducted. 
No multivariate main effects or interaction effects approach-
ed significance. The univariate F-test for overestimation 
n the second sub-item performed compared with the other two 
sub-items across groups was significant, F(2, 40) = 3.6928, 
£ < .04, with overestimation on the second sub-item being 
lower than that on other sub-items. 
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A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on under-
estimation by performance order by group. The interaction 
of group by performance order approached significance, Hotell-
ings F approximation: F(2, 39) = 2.5143, £ < .01, with 
the alcoholic group underestimating less on the second sub-
i tem performed. 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on under-
estimation by performance order by group. The interaction of 
group by performance order approached significance, Hotell-
ings F(2, 39) = 2.5143, £ < .01, with the alcoholic group 
underestimating less on the second sub-item performed. 
The hypothesis as stated was not supported. However, 
evidence was found for differences in overestimation by order 
of performance, and for a group by performance order inter-
action on underestimation. 
Hypothesis 13. Nonalcoholic subjects will demonstrate 
significantly higher use of positive -mood states as the first 
sub-item performed in behavioral observations of their memory 
tasks. This difference will be significantly attributable to 
trait and state depression as mediating variables. 
The number of items on which subjects performed the 
positive sub-item first although the negative sub-item was 
presented initially on the memory task form was used as the 
dependent variable. Alcoholic subjects had a mean of .5 
shifts to positive sub-items with a standard deviation of 
.964, whereas nonalcoholic subjects had a mean of 1.05 with a 
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standard deviation of 1.21; the difference between groups was 
not significant. The hypothesis was not supported. 
Although the number of shifts to positive poles was not 
different between the two groups, several interesting 
significant correlations of this variable with other 
variables emerged. The number of shifts to positive poles 
significantly correlated at the .05 level with the frequency 
of positive affect over two weeks (£ = .412), the frequency 
of negative affect over two weeks (£ = -.332), the number of 
shifts to a negative pole (£ = .312), absolute error on the 
second sub-item performed (£ = -.338), absolute error on the 
third sub-item performed (r = -.376), and underestimation of 
the first sub-item performed(£= -.293). 
Due to the asymmetrical of positive and negative 
effects of mood on memory, it was not hypothesized that 
alcoholics subjects would have higher use of negative moods 
as the first sub-item performed. When the number of items on 
which a subject did not perform the presented positive pole, 
but instead performed the negative pole first was 
investigated, however, unexpected group differences emerged. 
The alcoholic group mean was .3182, with a standard deviation 
of .48, whereas the nonalcoholic group mean was 1.182, with a 
standard deviation of .1.21. The difference between groups 
was significant, F(l, 42) =12.733, E < .0002, one-tailed, 
after removal of the effects of age and both types of 
depression in an ANOVA. Only age was significantly related 
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to shifting to negative sub-items, F (1, 39) = 4,623, E < 
.04. This variable had significant correlations at the .05 
level with only the sum of absolute error on the first 
sub-item chosen(£= -.335). 
Hypothesis 14. Alcoholic subjects will demonstrate 
strategic processing biases as stated in hypothesis 13 to a 
significantly lesser degree, but in the same direction as 
nonalcoholic subjects. This difference will be significantly 
attributable to trait and state depression as mediating 
variables. 
When groups are compared on the tendency to shift 
sub-item poles, more shifts of both types took place in the 
nonalcoholic group, as described above. Across groups the 
difference between negative shifts and positive shifts was 
small and nonsignificant, t (43) = .12, NS. The nonalcoholic 
group had more shifts to negative poles than to positive 
poles, and the alcoholic group had more shifts to positive 
poles than to negative poles. Therefore, contrary to the 
hypothesis, the dominant type of shift was different for each 
group. As stated under the results for Hypothesis 13, the 
significant differences on use of the positive pole and 
negative pole were not significantly attributable to 
depression. The hypothesis was not supported. 
To summarize the findings on strategic processing: 
nonalcoholic subjects demonstrated significantly more 
strategic processing than alcoholics, as predicted. Some 
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significant correlations were found between strategic 
processing variables and depression variables. However, 
contrary to the assumptions of these hypotheses, group 
differences in strategic processing were not significantly 
attributable to depression. Some evidence supported the 
assumption that order of sub-item performance was related to 
accuracy in general and specifically to underestimation of 
the first sub-item performed. Nonalcoholic subjects 
demonstrated significantly more shifts to both negative 
sub-items and to positive sub-items than did alcoholic 
subjects, although only the higher number of shifts to 
positive sub-items was predicted. Contrary to prediction, 
the type of shift made did not vary with either the kind of 
depression or with group membership. 
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
The Effects of State and Trait Depression 
on Affective Memory 
Understanding the relationship between the two measures 
of depression used in the present study is key in under-
standing the results for all three sets of hypotheses. As 
was expected, the correlation between the two measures was 
positive, moderate in magnitude (r = .351), and comparable to 
correlations found in other studies. However, several of the 
hypotheses tested assumed different and opposing effects on 
memory of trait and state depression. Trait depression was 
assumed to cause decreased self-protective bias due to 
depressive realism, increased inaccuracy of memory related to 
cognitive inefficiency, and decreased strategic processing 
related to depression-related declines in initiative, motiva-
tion, and capacity. State depression was assumed to cause 
increased depressogenic bias and to guide the direction of 
strategic processing by decreasing the use of the positive 
pole as the first item performed among sub-items. 
In the case of hypotheses based on these assumptions 
about state depression, significant effects, when observed, 
were found to be stronger for the trait measure than for the 
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state measure, suggesting that the two kinds of depression at 
times have similar, not opposing effects, and that the two 
measures could be considered measures of the same construct, 
with the MMPI Scale 2 being the more sensitive, or reliable 
measure. 
The finding of low levels of state depression in both 
groups also challenges the assumption that two separate 
depressive processes were influencing memory in the present 
study. From the conceptualization of diagnostic severity and 
current mood introduced earlier, one would expect individuals 
who were trait depressed to also be more likely to be in a 
depressed mood at the time of the memory task. Thus it was 
predicted that the alcoholic group and the nonalcoholic group 
would differ in levels of both kinds of depression. However, 
the level of state depression in both groups was surprisingly 
low. Even in the alcoholic group, which had 8 individuals 
with clinical levels of trait depression, only 3 persons were 
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state depressed by the less stringent non-patient norms. 
Perhaps stronger effects for state depression would have been 
observed in samples with higher levels of state depression, 
or larger samples with a greater range of state depression. 
Several possibilities exist to account for for this low 
level of state depression. It could be argued that the SCL 
90 is not a sensitive measure of state depression, since it 
is a measure of general distress over two weeks, and not a 
measure of a specific affect at the moment of testing. Also 
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it is possible the administration of the memory task at the 
end of two weeks of beeper carrying and self-reporting, 
accompanied by the attention given to the subject's 
experiences by the experimenters served as a positive mood 
induction that influenced the entire experimental situation, 
including memory estimates, SCL 90 scores, and strategic 
processing of sub-items (both the SCL 90 and the Memory Task 
were performed in the presence of the experimenters). The 
SCL 90 and other self-report measures of depression have been 
shown to be highly correlated with measures of social 
desirability response sets (Tanaka-Matsumi & Kameoka, 1986). 
Some evidence for two separate depressive processes 
related to memory was garnered from the data, despite the low 
level of state depression. Two exceptions to the general-
ization that trait depression effects are stronger than 
and parallel to state depression effects were found in 
the present study; both were consistent with the assumption 
of two separate depression processes. The first exception 
was that state depression was more strongly related to 
strategic processing than was trait depression. The second 
exception was found among correlations between the depression 
measures and the components of depression bias scores and 
self-protective bias scores. Whenever the correlations were 
of any interpretable magnitude, the two types of depression 
had relationships in the same direction, but the type of 
depression with the higher correlation varied among the 
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measures. Although it is possible to attribute these 
differences to sampling error, they are consistent with 
theories premising two separated depressive processes. · 
(These exceptions will be discussed in more detail later and 
are cited here only as partial evidence of separate depres-
sive processes). 
Given the caveats concerning the state depression 
measure and the low levels of state depression observed, the 
one significant effect for state depression different for 
that of trait depression and several situations where state 
depression had stronger, albeit nonsignificant, correlations 
with relevant variables are viewed here as fairly persuasive 
evidence for two separate depressive processes. Therefore, 
the effects of each type of depression on memory and cog-
nitive strategy will be discussed separately before an 
attempt will be made to understand their combined effects. 
In the present study, the effects of trait depression 
on memory were assumed to be stronger than those for state 
depression, and more hypotheses related to trait depression 
were tested. To briefly review the results related to these 
hypotheses, as predicted, the groups differed significantly 
in the level of trait depression. However, not all of the 
differences found between groups on negative affect measures, 
record variability measures, and memory were related to trait 
depression. Memory accuracy for negative and positive moods 
was related differently to trait depression, which increased 
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accuracy on positive moods and decreased accuracy on negative 
moods. When depression was controlled, negative affect 
differences were more pronounced between alcoholic and . 
nonalcoholic subjects. Memory estimates by alcoholics were 
less sensitive to extremes of mood state occurrences, 
although they had experienced a higher percent of extreme 
responses. 
These results suggest that trait depression is related 
to negative affective experience, but that alcoholics when 
compared to nonalcoholics experience significantly more 
additional negative affect that is unrelated to depression. 
Trait depression is related to reduced variability in 
emotional experiences, as well as to increased emotional 
extremes; these extremes subsequently have less of a 
distorting impact on memory in trait depressed alcoholic 
subjects than is the case with the less depressed non-
alcoholic subjects. The later finding is consistent with 
the depressive realism prediction that alcoholics, being more 
depressed, will recall experiences (especially negative 
experiences) with less self-protective bias than controls. 
Despite the significant effects of depression related 
to differences between the alcoholic and nonalcoholic groups, 
controls were not found to have significantly higher self-
protecti ve bias scores, as would have been consistent with 
the depressive realism view that nondepressed persons distort 
memories in order to protect themselves, whereas depressed 
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alcoholics do not. A cognitive deficit view also does not 
account for the findings, since accuracy varied by item type, 
with the two groups being significantly different only on 
items with negative content. The findings on trait depres-
sion are more consistent with the view that alcoholics 
have a depressogenic bias: alcoholics overestimate negative 
events more and ·overestimate positive events less than do 
nonalcoholic subjects. Note that this pattern remains even 
when the frequency of negative mood state occurrence is 
statistically controlled. 
On the other hand, contrary to predictions following 
from the assumption of depressogenic cognitive schema in 
alcoholics, the alcoholics underestimate negative mood items 
more than nonalcoholic subjects. The fact that the two 
groups report negative affective memories with different 
degrees of accuracy, with the alcoholic group both over-
estimating and underestimating negative affects more than 
nonalcoholics is consistent with a psychodynamic interpre-
tation that the alcoholic subjects have powerful defenses 
against negative affect which involve alternately avoiding 
and immersing themselves in negative affects, especially 
depression (Khantzian, 1980). 
Full investigation of this possibility would involve 
item by item analysis of the data to find which items were 
contribµting most to these differences, with apriori hypo-
theses made about each item in regard its relevance to 
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the various spheres of conflict typical of alcoholics. 
Such an investigation would also have to take into 
consideration that the alcoholics treated in an Alcoholics 
Anonymous oriented facility (as was the case with those in 
the present study) are engaged in daily ideological training 
related to the relative value and dangers of mood states and 
the importance of the "owning" of various negative emotions. 
If such training is effective, a new basis of self-esteem 
based on perceiving one's self as either consistent or 
inconsistent with the treatment ideology may influence 
emotional experience, self-reports of that experience, and 
ultimately may influence memory estimates. In essence, an 
artificial source of cognitive bias related to affect and 
affective memories, an artificial defense, may be provided by 
Alcoholics Anonymous oriented treatment to alcoholic 
subjects and not to the nonalcoholic subjects. Additional 
conflict about negative moods might be created by such 
. 
treatment if the new treatment related cognitive biases are 
not compatible with the alcoholic's previous cognitive 
predispositions. 
Beyond the effects of indoctrination and attitude 
change, such treatment may alsq involve increased rehearsal 
of various moods, both covertly' and overtly. Lynn Hasher 
(personal communication, November, 1986) has suggested the 
group differences in accuracy by emotional content.found in 
the preliminary study might be due to different levels of 
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memory rehearsal between groups Such rehearsal could be 
generated by affective processes, naturally occurring 
cognitive structures, or the directed rehearsal provided· in 
A.A. group activities. Clearly, however, confirming or 
refuting these speculations remains beyond the scope of the 
present study. 
Little remains to be discussed about the effects of 
state depression as independent of trait depression. 
Although the two groups did not differ significantly in the 
level of state depression, evidence was found to support the 
existence of increased depressive bias in alcoholics, with 
this bias consisting primarily in the overestimation of 
negative emotional events. Depressive bias differences were 
not significantly attributable to state depression, but 
across groups depressive bias was significantly correlated 
with both forms of depression, with this relationship being 
stronger for trait depression than state depression. These 
findings appear to be consistent with Beck's view of a 
depressogenic cognitive stance wherein cognitive structures 
influence perceptions, affects, and memories, which in turn 
interactively influence mood predispositions. The obser-
vation of depressive bias in alcoholics in the absence 
of high levels of state depression favors Beck's cognitive 
schema view, which provides the mediation of memory bias by a 
depressogenic cognitive structure that is not dependent on 
current depressed affect. These findings do not support 
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Bower's original formulation of mood selectivity theory, 
however, which states that it is the current mood, not 
longstanding cognitive or affective predispositions, that 
influences availability of mood relevant memories. 
The present study's procedures and hypotheses have 
assumed that it is the combined effects of state and trait 
depression that accounts for accuracy and bias differences 
between alcoholics and nonalcoholic subjects. As mentioned 
earlier, the exceptions to the general rule of trait 
depression having a stronger influence on accuracy and bias 
than state depression are an important place to begin 
formulating what those combined effects might be. When the 
correlations of state and trait depression with the com-
ponents of self-protective bias and depressive bias are 
examined, a plausible model for the combined effects of two 
separate depressive processes can be constructed based on 
their selective impacts on positive and negative affective 
memories. Increases in state depression were significantly 
related to decreases in overestimation of positive items, 
whereas the relationship of this variable with trait 
depression was not significant. The correlation of under-
estimation of positive moods with state depression was 
higher than that of trait depression with this measure. Both 
types of depression had negligible correlations with the 
underestimation of negative moods. Both types of depression 
had significant positive correlations with the overestimation 
of negative moods, with that with trait depression being 
appreciably higher. 
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These correlations may be the result of two depressive 
processes, which can be distinguished from each other by 
their different magnitudes of impact on positive and negative 
affective memories. In turn, these different impacts on 
affective memories can be viewed as related to self-
protective bias and depressive bias. State depression 
may be the primary source of self protective bias deficits 
which it causes by inhibiting an otherwise dominant trend 
toward maximizing positive events in memory. Trait 
depression may be the primary source of increased depressive 
bias by maximizing negative events in memory, perhaps in part 
via increased covert rehearsal of negative moods. 
This view combines Alloy and Abramson's (1981) con-
struct of the absence of self-protective bias in depressives 
with the depressogenic bias of Beck (1974) and other cognitive 
theorists. The fact that in the present study, state depres-
sion correlated with positive memory content more than did 
trait depression is also consistent with reports in the lit-
erature of asymmetrical mood selectivity effects, that is 
that congruity of mood and stimuli increases recall and 
retrieval for positive stimuli, but the same effect is less 
powerful for negative mood and negative stimuli (Isen, 
Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978). Asymmetry of mood enhances 
integrative theories such as Johnson and Magraro's (1987). 
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Strategic Processing, Memory, and Affect 
The order of sub-item performance and accuracy by 
sub-item performance were used in the present study as 
behavioral indices of cognitive strategies involving both 
affective and cognitive components. Weighing the relative 
strengths and directions among hypothetical affective and 
cognitive processes to predict outcomes on a previously 
unexplored behavioral measure is clearly a risky endeavor. 
Nevertheless, significant differences between groups on these 
behavioral indices were found, accompanied by significant 
relationships with cognitive and affective measures. 
Unfortunately, the significant relationships among these sets 
of variables were not consistently those predicted. 
As predicted, significant relationships were found be-
tween behavioral measures of cognitive strategy and measures 
of cognitive output: accuracy and bias measures. Due to 
differences in strategic processing, the two groups had 
eifferent typical outcomes on the first sub-item performed. 
For the alcoholic group, the first sub-item performed was 
most likely to be the first sub-item presented on the memory 
task form, and to be less accurate than the two subsequent 
sub-item judgments. For the nonalcoholic group, the first 
sub-item performed was not likely to be the one presented on 
the memory form, and was not likely to be the most inaccurate 
of the three sub-item judgments. For both groups the first 
sub-item performed was on the average the most overestimated 
among the three sub-items. 
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Evidence was provided for the assumption that accuracy 
and bias were related to the order of sub-item performance. 
As strategic processing increased (as measured by the number 
of sub-items performed in an order other than that presented 
on the memory task form), self-protective bias scores 
increased significantly, as did accuracy on positive mood 
items. The number of shifts to negative sub-items was 
significantly correlated with increased accuracy on the first 
sub-item performed. The number of shifts to positive items 
was significantly correlated with less underestimation of the 
first sub-item performed, and with reduced error on sub-
sequent sub-items. Taken together these findings suggest 
that increased strategic processing as defined in the present 
study is related to increased accuracy and increased self-
protecti ve bias. 
The nonalcoholic group made significantli more shifts 
to both positive and negative mood poles than did the 
alcoholic group. Contrary to earlier predictions, this 
significant difference between alcoholic and nonalcoholic 
subjects in strategic processing was not significantly 
attributable to depression. However, the negative 
correlation of state depression with items performed as 
presented approached significance. This suggests that the 
moderate levels of state depression observed in the present 
study may increase strategic processing, whereas (again 
contrary to the prediction made in the present study) trait 
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depression has less impact on strategic processing of this 
kind of task. 
Stronger evidence linked the use of strategic 
processing to affect generally, rather than to specific 
measures of depression. Strategic processing was found to 
increase significantly with positive affect over the two week 
recording interval. The number of shifts to positive poles 
increased significantly with the frequency of positive affect 
over two weeks and decreased significantly with the frequency 
of negative affect over two weeks. Given these significant 
relationships of strategic processing variables with 
occurrences of affect in ways consistent with a process that 
would be expected to decrease with depression, it is 
surprising that no significant relationship with depression 
was detected, and that the relationship that approached 
significance suggested an increase in strategic processing 
with an increase in state depression. 
Several explanations of these findings may be advanced. 
A simple explanation of the failure to find significant 
relationships between strategic processing and depression is 
that the absence of the expected relationship is an artifact 
of the depression measures. Specifically, the limitations of 
the state depression measure and the unexpectedly restricted 
range in state depression described previously may have 
obscured the relationship between state depression and 
strategic processing. A similar argument to account for the 
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failure to find a relationship between trait depression and 
strategic processing is less convincing, however, since high 
levels of trait depression and significant differences in 
trait depression scores were found between alcoholics and 
nonalcoholics. 
Perhaps, as was assumed in the hypotheses of this 
study, the amount and direction of strategic processing are 
controlled by different kinds of depression. Trait 
depression may determine the amount of strategic processing, 
while state depression may determine the choice of either the 
positive or negative mood pole when it does occur. This 
would explain the higher strategic processing by nonalcoholic 
subjects, who had significantly lower trait depression, and 
the absence of any clear difference in the direction of 
processing either within or between the groups, due to the 
low level of state depression in both groups. However, two 
facts argue powerfully against this interpretation: the 
differences observed between groups were not significantly 
attributable to depression, and the trait depression measure 
(on which the groups were significantly different) was only 
weakly correlated with the amount of strategic processing. 
Another possibility is also consistent with the 
assumption of two separate depressive processes which may 
interact. Trait depression may inhibit strategic processing, 
whereas state depression may increase it. In such a 
scenario, individuals with low trait depression and moderate 
-3.. 2 2 
state depression would be most likely to exhibit strategic 
processing. These individuals would most likely occur in the 
control group, which had significantly lower trait depression 
and roughly equivalent state depression when compared to the 
alcoholic group. A similar explanation involves interactions 
between levels of depression rather than interactions between 
types of depression, and is based on the hypothesis that the 
relationship between any form of depression and strategic 
processing is not linear. For example, high levels of 
depression may inhibit strategic processing, moderate levels 
may motivate increased strategic processing, and low levels 
may not provide the requisite motivation. 
To the extent that the difference between groups in 
strategic processing may be attributed to some depressive 
process, or interaction of depressive processes, the relative 
paucity of strategic processing in alcoholic subjects appears 
to argue against both the earlier proposed psychodynamic view 
of defensive responding in alcoholics and Beck's depress-
ogenic world view theory (Beck, 1976), but is consistent 
with Schwartz's interpretation of depressive realism as 
related to the absence of cognitive strategies and the general 
failure of the defenses in depression (Schwartz, 1981a; 
198lb). 
Personality traits other than the predisposition toward 
depression are also probably reflected in the strategic 
processing measures. Subjects were told they may perform 
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sub-items however they may choose, but were not otherwise 
encouraged to develop any strategy. Passivity, compliance, 
and oppositionality are traits that may be relevant in such a 
context, as well as creativity and field dependence/ 
independence. 
Explanations of these group differences based on 
factors other than personality may be more convincing. 
Perhaps cognitive capacity differences between groups is a 
relevant factor in determining strategic processing differ-
ences. The fact that the groups have roughly equivalent 
memory accuracy performances when item content is not con-
sidered makes this interpretation less plausible upon first 
examination. However, memory for frequency of occurrences 
is conceptualized as a low capacity demand cognitive 
function, has been typified as automatic, or effortless. 
The memory task is a test of incidental learning. Cognitive 
functions other than incidental learning and are involved in 
the strategic processing measures. The strategic processing 
of a cognitive task is conceptualized as a relatively effort-
ful, high capacity demand cognitive function, requiring more 
mental faculties, and involving intention, initiative, and 
probably the absence of apathy toward the task. The 
alcoholics might have been less motivated to perform the task 
creatively, or less apt to use available cognitive strategies 
while maintaining the ability to do so. This passive, less 
initiating tendency is strikingly similar in some ways 
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to what one might expect from depressed subjects, but may 
have sources other than depression in alcoholic subjects. 
These other sources may also account for the significant 
relationship between gender and strategic processing, such 
that males performed significantly more items as presented, 
as did alcoholic subjects. Since male alcoholics typically 
have more severe courses than female alcoholics, according to 
some researchers, the observed differences in strategic 
processing may be related to a severity factor that reduces 
effortful processing, or the spontaneous initiation of 
effortful processes. 
Limitations of the Present Study 
The present study would have been improved considerably 
by increasing the number of subjects in each group, providing 
multiple measures of both trait and state depression, and 
measuring the severity of both cognitive deficits and 
alcoholism symptoms. In addition, the concept of bias and 
how it is measured might have been refined. 
Several caveats have already been advanced about the 
use of the SCL 90 as a measure of state depression, and the 
possibility that a positive mood induction was unintention-
ally included in the administration of the memory task 
and state depression measure. The SCL 90 has been used 
for this purpose in other studies, and despite its limita-
tions, it nonetheless remains appropriate in studies involving 
clinical subjects. Although depression was operationally 
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measured in two ways (the SCL 90 DEP and the MMPI Scale 2) 
two separate constructs were assumed. A separate measure of 
state depression specific to the moment that the memory· task 
was performed would have been a valuable addition to this 
experiment, which for other constructs (accuracy, bias, 
strategic processing) utilized more than one operational 
measure. 
A ESF self-report of mood at the time of memory task 
performance might have provided a suitable second measure of 
state depression. This would have provided both a second 
measure of state depression, and a means to investigate the 
possibility that the experimental procedures themselves 
contained a mood induction. ESF reports for subjects could 
be obtained after systematically controlling for the presence 
or absence of two weeks of self reporting, interviews, and 
memory task. Following the same logic for a second measure 
of trait depression, perhaps the BDI or other trait measure 
could have been used for a second measure of this construct. 
The use of relatively small numbers of subjects in each 
group is both a strength and a weakness of the present study. 
Significant differences and correlations were found even with 
these modest samples; the use of larger samples might have 
made less ambiguous those situations in which one-tailed 
tests were required to reach significance, or where 
statistical tests approached significance. 
Ideally, the present study would include a measure of 
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cognitive efficiency separate from the memory accuracy and 
bias measures related to ESF records. Scores from subtest of 
the WAIS-R or other relevant tests sensitive to cognitive 
deficits might have been used. The Wechsler Memory Scale 
paired associated learning subtest might have provided a 
measure of affectively neutral verbal memory and learning. 
Such measures could be used to investigate the possibility 
that cognitive efficiency or capacity differences mediated 
some of the differences between groups that are not attribut-
able to depression. 
Related to the criticism that no external measure of 
cognitive efficiency or capacity was used in the present 
study is the criticism that a severity measure for alcoholic 
course would be needed to understand any between group 
differences that might emerge on any of the other measures. 
It is notoriously difficult to equate courses and severity of 
alcohol abuse, weighing years of use, periods of abstinence 
or unproblematic use, binge using, dose per episode, average 
intake per interval of use, and the presence and frequency of 
pathognomic symptoms such as hallucinations, black outs, and 
physical complications. The alcoholics in the present study 
were equated only by their recent treatment. This implies 
only a degree of alcohol related symptoms severe enough to 
result in treatment, and the existence of a period of 
recuperation, abstinence, and recovery deemed sufficient 
enough by the treatment facility to merit discharge. Clearly 
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both depression and cognitive deficits may be related to 
severity of use, and a measure of what probably was a wide 
range in severity of alcoholism would have been useful in 
investigating these relationships. 
Finally, the concept of bias is limited in the present 
study. Bias in regard to affective memory may exist in at 
least three forms. Bias may exist not only in the degree of 
overestimation or underestimation, as was the emphasis in the 
present study, but also bias may be reflected in the tendency 
to overestimate or underestimate generally. It may also be 
reflected in both more overestimation and more under-
estimation on the same category of mood item, as was the 
case with alcoholics in the present study who overestimated 
and underestimated negative moods more often than controls, 
yet had higher correlations of their estimates of negative 
moods with their reported negative moods, thus suggesting 
that the greater error was not simply inaccuracy, but bias. 
As suggested earlier item by item analysis of this third type 
of bias is required. Any of the three forms of bias 
discussed here may be mediated by depression or other 
affective factors. 
Conclusions and Implications for Future Research 
The present study made several methodological 
contributions to the understanding affect and cognition in 
alcoholics. ~y using both state and trait measures of 
depression and clinical subjects, it provided an example ~f 
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operationalizing recent theoretical formulations about the 
effects of current mood and affective psychopathology on 
memory. To the author's knowledge, it is the first study to 
introduce both state and trait depression measures in 
research on memory biases related to depression. This is 
also the first study to use the ESM to investigate memory for 
rate of mood state occurrence. Another methodological 
contribution was the development of behavioral indices of 
cognitive processes. Based on order of item choice, these 
behavioral measures consistently resulted in significant 
differences between alcoholics and nonalcoholics, suggesting 
that such indices may be useful for investigating variables 
related to alcoholism other than depression. 
The present study's findings lend support to Beck's 
(1976) theory of depressive biases in the cognitive 
functioning of depressives, specifically for affective memory 
functioning. It was demonstrated that depression is 
significantly related to the tendency to make more error on 
items with negative emotional content than on other items, 
with the additional error primarily being due to the 
overestimation of rates of reported negative mood states. 
This finding, among others in the present study, adds to the 
growing body of research that points to an asymmetry of the 
selectivity effects of mood on memories for positive versus 
negative content (Isen, et al., 1978). 
The present study suggests several directions for 
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future research. Research using the ESM is growing, but the 
use of that method to investigate memory for frequency of 
mood occurrence is unique to the present study. It is hoped 
that other studies will be conducted investigating memory for 
mood in a wide range of clinical and nonclinical populations. 
The role of affective predispositions, current affect, and 
cognitive structures relevant to affect would remain 
variables of interest in such studies regardless of the 
population under investigation. 
The critique above provides more specific directions 
for future research. A study similar to the present study 
could be conducted, but with a larger number of subjects, 
added depression measures, external measures of cognitive 
efficiency, a severity index for alcoholism, and an improved 
approach to bias. 
Studies of memory bias before and after in vivo 
ingestion of alcohol might be incorporated in a programmatic 
investigation of some of the issues raised in the present 
study. Intentional mood induction before the memory task 
could also be used to investigate the relationship between 
state and trait depression in alcoholics and normals, with 
induction of various moods combined with alcohol ingestion in 
some trials to investigate the effects of alcohol on memory 
accuracy and bias under varying conditions of current mood. 
Memory for affects in controlled stimuli other than the self 
might also be investigated under the same conditions, such as 
memory for the affect expressed by characters in a brief 
story or film. 
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The attempt to track cognitive strategies by means of 
measures formed from simple behavioral observations could 
produce several fruitful lines of research. Depression did 
not account for most of the observed differences between 
groups, leaving much room for personality and cognitive 
variables to be investigated. Perhaps the simple method of 
observing order of performance of a limited range of choices 
could be used effectively for investigating functions other 
than memory. These functions might include those related to 
decision making and problem solving: for example, information 
collection, abstraction, and the way people divide whole 
tasks into smaller parts. 
In general, any research conducted with the goal of 
delineating further the role of various affective processes 
on memory in alcoholics, that may not be symmetrical for 
nonalcoholics would be a useful contribution to following up 
on some of the findings in the present study, and clarifying 
some of the many issues it leaves unresolved. Although the 
scope of such studies might be more focused than that of the 
present study, and more tied to a specific theoretical per-
spective, it is hoped that this attempt to combine affective, 
cognitive, and behavioral aspects of a clinically relevant 
situation will serve as encouragement to other researchers to 
also avoid isolating these aspects in future studies. 
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MEMORY TASK INSTRUCTIONS 
NOTE: Use this answer sheet and a blank booklet to get the person oriented 
to the task. 
KEY POINTS: 
1. Want to get the subject to think about how he/she filled out the 
booklet, not how they felt then or now about the items. Many subjects 
may use their recollection of feelings to "jog" their memories as 
to how they filled out the book. 
2. These responses are in terms of percentages of 100%. 
3. After you explain the task, see if they can tell you what they are 
going to be doing. 
4. "General Explanation": We are trying to understand how people 
remember and what ways people may or may not use to remember things. 
What we'd like you to do is help us in the memory test. There are 
no right or wrong answers. All we will ask you to do is remember 
some aspects of what you have been doing in regards to the patient 
workbook. 
We are going to concentrate on trying to find out how you filled 
out ("marked") the book; not how you were feeling. This memory 
task is only related to how you filled out the qustions. 
5. Under the heading of General Questions: 
The first two (#1 and #2) refer to a special dimension of memory. 
All these questions are getting at is how often the mark was to 
the right or left of the page. 
Question #2 and #3 are related to the positive and/or negative 
dimension of the item. This is the emotional/feeling aspect of 
the task. 
Help the subjects understand these two related, but by very 
distinct tasks. Repeat it or have them repeat it before they do 
the task. You can ref er to the mood rating scale on the page 
itself or to the unanswered page in the booklet. 
6. When the subject actually gets to the mood items that are scaled 
like the booklet, make it clear that the (brackets) 
over the various responses are calling for a summary of those marks. 
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The total repsonse should equal 100%. They can answer the questions 
any way they choose (e.g., figuring out% positive, then neutral, 
and then negative or whatever sequence they choose). 
7. The final four questions ask for two ratings that cut across these 
dimensions. Again, these are summaries of their marks and the total 
has to equal 100%. 
Refer to the blank booklet to orient subject, if necessary. 
8. Some subjects, when given the instructions, will feel it is impossible 
to do. Encourage them, provide extra time, suggest that whatever 
they can do will be helpful. 
If subject persists, then excuse him/her from the task. 
SCHEDULE OF SUBJECTS 
1. Presently Active Subjects 
Gp I Book 6 Overall Assessment 
Gp II Overall Assessment 
2. New Subjects as of 5/21/84 
Gp I Book 1 Book 6 Overall Assessment 
Gp II Book 1 x Overall Assessment 
3. Community Sample 
Book 1 
These forms will be located in a folder in Lil's desk (marked "Memory 
Study") and will be in the appropriate folders when subjects return. 
A red dot will remind you that the task needs to be done on a given 
subject. 
WJF/gj 
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Table B-1 
Mean Fregue~cy by Item and by Group 
Item Group 
Positives Nonalcoholic Alcoholic P Level 
M SD M SD 
Alert 69.7 23.0 't'9. lt t3". ·r 
Happy 64.3 20 .1 63.8 20.2 
Strong 41.0 30.8 55.2 23.5 
Active 49.6 27 .3 59.3 18.6 
Proud 
. 33.4 28.2 49.4 26.9 
CheerfuL 51.1 23.6 57.2 18.9 
Friendly 58.6 24.0 58.4 18.6 
Sociable 50.0 22.9 52.1 21.9 
Clear 61.5 33.3 63.6 21.8 
Relaxed 58.5 27.8 45.8 25.6 
Neithers Nonalcoholic Alcoholic P Level 
Alert/Drowsy 4.5 5.2 3.0 4.6 
Happy/Sad 24.8 18.3 18. 1 15.5 
Irritable/Cheerful 27.4 21.5 18.8 12.9 
Strong/Weak 43 .1 32.4 25.8 23.4 
Angry I Friendly 30.8 23.4 20.9 17.5 
Active/Passive 22.5 27.7 13.4 13.7 
Lonely I Sociable 32.1 25.1 17.9 18 .1 * 
Proud/ .A.shamed 62. 7 31.4 37 .1 27 .5 ** 
Confused/ Cl ear 26.9 31.5 14.9 13.9 
Tense/Relaxed 19 .1 19.9 12.8 19.0 
Table B-1 -Continued. 
Mean Frequency by Test Item and by Group 
Item 
Negatives Nonalcoholic 
M SD 
Angry 10.6 7.4 
Irritable 21.4 10. 1 
Lonely 17.9 20.3 
Confused 11.6 10.8 
Tense 22.3 17 .1 
Drowsy 25.8 20.2 
Sad 11.0 9.2 
Weak 15.9 15.5 
Passive 27.8 17.3 
Ashamed 3.9 5.7 
Non-Mood Items Nonalcoholic 
M SD 
Preoccu. Eating 5.7 6.5 
Preoccu. Using 2.6 5.3 
Confident-Resist. 94.5 8.4 
Shared 14.0 14. 7 
NOTE: .!!. = 22 for all group means. 
* p < .05. 
Hp< .01. 
Group 
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Alcoholic P Level 
M SD 
20.7 14.8 
23.9 15.5 
20.0 20.6 
21.6 15.9 * 
41.4 21.7 ** 
17.6 14 .1 
18 .1 16.9 
19.0 13.4 
27 .3 18.5 
13.4 12. 7 * 
Alcoholic P Level 
M SD 
7.4 10.3 
5. 1 9.0 
88.3 19.5 
3.3 28.3 ** 
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Table B-2 
Mean Estimates by Item and by Group 
Item Group 
Positives Nonalcoholic Al.coholic P Level 
M SD M SD 
Alert 69.2 24.0 69.7 25.6 
Happy 67.6 31. 2 62.6 29.8 
Strong 48.2 36.2 54.3 31.5 
Active 58.5 32.4 62.1 27.2 
Proud 33.0 35.0 52.6 36.2 
Cheerful 62.6 29.9 59 .1 29.7 
Friendly 70.6 29.3 61.5 28.7 
Sociable 64.1 33.09 53.0 29.4 
Clear 71.6 31.3 63.9 30.3 
Relaxed 58.1 33.4 45.8 33.8 
Neithers Nonalcoholic Alcoholic P Level 
Alert/Drowsy 7 .1 9.8 17.7 23 .1 
Happy/Sad 22.6 30.8 21.2 28.7 
Irritable/Cheerful 22.5 28.0 18. 7 22.7. 
Strong/Weak 38.5 37.4 26.7 33.5 
Angry/Friendly 21.0 28.7 17 .1 22.9 
Active/Passive 22.8 33.7 17.3 23.8 
Lonely I Sociable 22.0 29.8 18.9 29.1 
Proud/Ashamed 61.8 38.2 34.5 37.4 * 
Confused/Clear 24.2 29.5 15 .1 18. 7 
Tense/Relaxed 20.7 19.8 41.3 32.0 
Table B-2 -Continued 
Mean Estimates by Item and by Group 
Item 
Negatives Nonalcoholic 
M SD 
Angry 8.5 7.9 
Irritable 14.9 15.5 
Lonely 13.9 18.4 
Confused 8.4 11.5 
Tense 20.7 19.8 
J;>rowsy 23.5 19.6 
Sad 9.6 10.3 
Weak 13.4 14.2 
Passive 18. 7 16.9 
Ashamed 2.5 4.7 
Non-Mood Items Nonalcoholic 
M SD 
Preoccu. Eating 10.2 16.2 
Preoccu. Using 2.5 4.5 
Confident-Resist. 62.1 47.8 
Shared 26.8 26.4 
NOTE: .!! = 22 for all group means. 
* p < .05. 
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Group 
Alcoholic l Level 
M SD 
23.5 25.4 * 
22.2 25.2 
27 .6 25.0 * 
21.0 22.4 
* 
41.3 32.0 * 
16.3 19.2 
16 .1 18.3 
19.0 16.3 
20.6 19 .1 
12.8 18.5 • 
Alcoholic l Level 
M SD 
20.2 30.0 
16.8 27 .5 * 
61.0 41.8 
43.1 31.9 
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Table B-3 
Signed Difference Scores by Item and by Group 
Item Group 
Positives Nonalcoholic Alcoholic ! Level 
M SD M SD 
Alert 0.4 16.5 9.7 21.0 
Happy 3.3 22.7 1.2 18.6 
Strong 0.72 24.7 1.2 18.6 
Active .0.9 19 .6 ·2.8 19.9 
Proud 0.3 20.7 3.2 17.7 
Cheerful 11.6 18.6 1.9 18.6 
Friendly 12 .1 21.8 3.0 18.2 
Sociable 4.2· 23.5 0.9 20.8 
Clear 0 .1 22.1 0.3 17 .1 
Relaxed ·0.4 19.6 o.o 17.7 
Neithers Nonalcoholic Alcoholic P Level 
Alert/Drowsy 2.6 9.4 14.6 21.8 
Happy/Sad 2.2 23.7 .3.2 19.5 
Irritable/Cheerful 4.9 17.3 0 .1 17.6 
Strong/Weak 4.6 23.6 0.9 17.5 
Angry/Friendly 9.8 19.8 3.7 14.8 
Active/Passive 0.3 14.2 3.8 16.3 
Lonely/Sociable 10.1 19.6 1.0 23.7 
Proud/Ashamed 0.9 26.8 2.6 20.8 
Confused/Clear 2.7 22.0 -0 .3 12.7 
Tense/Relaxed 2.1 24.7 ·O .1 13.6 
Table B-3 -Continued. 
Signed Difference Scores by Item and by Group 
Item 
Negatives Nonalcoholic 
M SD 
Angry 2.1 6.7 
Irritable 6.6 12.9 
Lonely 4.0 13.6 
Confused 3.2 11.8 
Tense 1.7 16.5 
Drowsy 2. J.J 15.0 
Sad 1.3 10.5 
Weak 2.6 9.8 
Passive 9.1 12.3 
Ashamed 1 • J.J 4.0 
Non-Mood Items Nonalcoholic 
M SD 
Preoccu. Eating -4.6 15.4 
Preoccu. Using 0.1 5.8 
Confident-Resist. 32.J.J 51.6 
Shared 12.8 25.9 
NOTE: J!. = 22 for all group means • 
• p < .05. 
Group 
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Alcoholic P Level 
M SD 
~-7 20.0 
1. 7 20.1 
2.3 14.6 
0.6 14 .1 
0 .1 21.7 
1.3 10.4 
2.0 9 .1 
o.o 14.2 
6.6 16.4 
.06 12.4 
Alcoholic l Level 
M SD 
12.9 25.4 
·11. 7 22.6 * 
·27 .2 40.0 
·9.8 37.2 
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Table B-4 
Absolute Difference Scores by Item and by Group 
Item Group 
Positives Nonalcoholic Alcoholic P Level 
M SD M SD 
Alert 13.0 9.7 16.4 16 .1 
Happy 18.0 13.5 14.9 10.7 
Strong 17 .8 18.31 15.2 10 .1 
Active 14.7 15.5 16.4 11.0 
Proud 15.3 13.5 13.8 11.2 
Cheerful 16.9 13.6 14.0 12.0 
Friendly 19.9 14.6 13 .8 . 11.8 
Sociable 20.8 17.5 16 .1 12. 7 
Clear 15.7 18.3 13.5 10 .1 
Relaxed 15.2 11.8 14.4 9.8 
Neithers Nonalcoholic Alcoholic l Level 
Alert/Drowsy 6.0 7.6 15.4 21.2 
Happy/Sad 18.8 13.9 14.8 12.8 
Irritable/Cheerful 14.6 9.9 13.4 11.0 
Strong/Weak 17.6 16.0 12.3 12.2 
Angry/Friendly 17.7 12.8 10 .1 11.3 
Active/Passive 10.6 9.2 10 .6 12.8 
Lonely/ Sociable 16.7 14 .1 16.4 16.7 
Proud/Ashamed 18.2 19.2 16.8 12.0 
Confused/Clear 15.5 15.5 7.9 9.8 
Tense/Relaxed 17.3 17 .3 8.3 10.7 
Table B-4 -Continuen. 
Absolute Difference Scores by Item and by Group 
Item 
Negatives Nonalcoholic 
M SD 
Angry 5.5 4.2 
Irritable 11.0 9.2 
Lonely 7.6 11.9 
Confused 8.0 9 .1 
Tense 12.0 11 • 1 
Drowsy 11.0 10.2 
Sad 7.8 6.9 
Weak 7.5 6.7 
Passive 10.6 11.0 
Ashamed 2.3 3.5 
Non-Mood Items Nonalcoholic 
M SD 
Preoccu. Eating 7.9 13.9 
Preoccu. Using 2.9 5.0 
Confident-Resist. 40.2 45.5 
Shared 20.6 19.9 
NOTE: .!!. = 22 for all group means. 
* p < .05. 
Group 
Alcoholic 
M SD 
13.0 15 .1 
13 .1 15.0 
12.3 7.6 
9.6 10. 1 
16.9 13.0 
8.4 6 .1 
7.4 5.5 
10.9 8.7 
15 .1 8.7 
9.4 7.7 
Alcoholic 
M SD 
14.3 24.5 
12.5 22.2 
28.2 39.4 
27.0 26.8 
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